

Schnellrecherche der SFH-Länderanalyse vom 28. Januar 2016 zu Syrien: Demonstrationen gegen die Asad-Regierung in Qamishli im Jahr 2014

Frage an die SFH-Länderanalyse:

- Gibt es Informationen zu Demonstrationen in Qamishli gegen die Asad-Regierung (insbesondere vor der Kasmu-Moschee) im Jahr 2014 und darauffolgende Verhaftungen?

Die Informationen beruhen auf einer zeitlich begrenzten Recherche (Schnellrecherche) in öffentlich zugänglichen Dokumenten, die uns derzeit zur Verfügung stehen sowie auf den Informationen von einer sachkundigen Kontaktperson.

1 Demonstrationen in Qamishli im Jahr 2014

2014 fanden noch immer Demonstrationen gegen die Asad-Regierung statt. Verschiedene Quellen zeigen auf, dass auch im Jahr 2014 noch Demonstrationen gegen die Asad-Regierung in Qamishli stattgefunden haben. *The Syrian Observer* meldete am 19. März 2014, dass am 21. Februar 2014 in Qamishli eine öffentliche Demonstration gegen eine vorangegangene Pro-Regime-Kundgebung stattfand. *Kurdwatch* berichtete am 15. April 2014 von einer Anti-Regierungsdemonstration in Qamishli, an welcher am 7. April 2014 300 PYD-Anhänger teilnahmen. Gemäss *Al-Monitor* (2. Juni 2014) sahen viele Menschen kurdischer Ethnie die zunehmenden Konfrontationen zwischen dem syrischen Regime und kurdischen Kämpfern in Qamishli und Hasakah als Zeichen, dass die Regierung von Baschar al-Assad die kurdischen Rechte noch immer nicht respektierte. Mitglieder des kurdischen *Revolutionary Youth Movement* riefen daher in den kurdischen Gebieten im Norden Syriens zum Boykott der Präsidentschaftswahlen vom Juni 2014 auf und kündigten Demonstrationen an. Ein Syrien-Experte gab am 28. Januar 2016 an, dass er keine Kenntnis von grossen Demonstrationen gegen die Asad-Regierung in Qamishli Ende 2014 habe. Es scheint aber möglich, dass im genannten Zeitraum Demonstrationen in kleinerem Ausmass stattfanden. So ist es nach Angaben des Syrien-Experten immer möglich, dass sich kleinere Gruppen von Demonstrierenden versammelten. Die Kasmu-Moschee in Qamishli ist nach Angaben des Experten ein Ort, an welchem zwischen 2011 und 2013 viele Demonstrationen gegen die syrische Regierung stattgefunden haben.

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Im Rahmen dieser Schnellrecherche konnten keine Informationen zu Verhaftungen von Personen, welche 2014 an Anti-Regierungsdemonstrationen teilnahmen, gefunden werden.

Komplexe Situation in Qamishli. Wie bereits in der *SFH-Schnellrecherche* vom 10. September 2015 dargelegt, ist die Sicherheitssituation in Qamishli sehr komplex. Einige Quartiere stehen noch immer unter der Kontrolle der syrischen Regierung, andere sind in der Hand der PKK nahestehenden PYD (*Democratic Union Party*) und deren bewaffnetem Arm YPG (*People's Defence Corp*). Seit Ausbruch des Krieges kam es in Qamishli zu Konflikten zwischen verschiedenen Akteuren: «Zwischen den Kämpfern der YPG und dem Regime, zwischen der Freien Syrischen Armee und der



YPG, zwischen islamistischen Kräften gegen Milizen des Regimes und der YPG sowie auch unter den verschiedenen kurdischen Gruppen». Die Situation ändert sich sehr schnell (Schnellrecherche vom 10. September 2015).

The Syrian Observer, 19. März 2014:

«On 21 February 2014, after months of political and social silence, a public demonstration took to the streets of Qamishli in protest against a pro-regime rally which had been staged in the city a few days earlier. Notably, the only prominent political figure to take part in the demonstration was Hasan Saleh, a member of the political bureau of the Kurdish Yekiti party. In fact, he is the only political figure left in the city, the only one who has not escaped from Qamishli or abandoned anti-regime activity since the revolution begun.» Quelle: *The Syrian Observer*, Who's who: Hasan Saleh, 19. März 2014:

<http://syrianobserver.com/EN/Who/26875/Whoss+who+Hasan+Saleh>.

Kurdwatch, 15. April 2014:

«Al-Qamishli: PYD organizes anti-regime demonstration
KUDWATCH, April 15, 2014—**On April 7, 2014, approximately three hundred supporters of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) took part in an anti-regime demonstration in al-Qamishli on the day that marked the founding of the Ba`th party on April 7, 1947. At the demonstration, protestors labeled the Ba`th party as synonymous for oppression and as an enemy of the rights of the Kurds. Given the PYD's means of mobilizing supporters, the number of demonstrators was small.»** Quelle: *Kurdwatch*, Al-Qamishli: PYD organizes anti-regime demonstration, 15. April 2014: www.kurdwatch.org/?aid=3071&z=en.

Al-Monitor, 2. Juni 2014:

«In the run-up to the presidential elections, Syrian government forces have increasingly clashed with Kurdish fighters in Qamishli and Hasakah. Many Kurds see these clashes as a sign the Syrian government still does not respect Kurdish rights, suggests Kurdish official Ilham Ahmad. Moreover, they accuse the Syrian government of using al-Qaeda offshoot the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) to attack the Kurds.

*The Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), established an autonomous administration in the Kurdish areas of northern Syria in January of this year. **Members of the Kurdish youth group the Revolutionary Youth Movement, which is calling for boycotting the presidential elections, were attacked by regime supporters May 30. They are planning to hold demonstrations again on election day in Qamishli.***» Quelle: *Al-Monitor*, Syria's Kurdish region to boycott presidential elections, 2. Juni 2014:
www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/06/syria-kurds-assad-presidential-elections-pyd.html#.

SFH-Schnellrecherche «Qamishli / Reservisten» vom 10. September 2015:

«Wie bereits in der Schnellrecherche vom 22. Januar 2015 dargelegt, ist Qamishli eine multiethnische Stadt und gehört zur Provinz al-Hasaka im Nordosten Syriens an der Grenze zur Türkei. Die Sicherheitssituation in Qamishli ist komplex. Es handelt sich um die grösste Stadt in den kurdischen Gebieten, die von Kurden, Arabern, Assyriern und Alewiten bewohnt ist (International Crisis Group, 22. Januar 2013). Am 21. Januar 2014 wurde die Democratic Autonomous Administration des Kantons Cizîre (Jazeera) ausgerufen und einige Tage später wurde Qamishli zu dessen Hauptstadt bestimmt (ANF, 26. Januar 2014).

Einige Quartiere sind in der Hand der PKK nahestehenden Democratic Union Party (PYD) und deren bewaffnetem Arm People's Defence Corps (YPG). Andere stehen immer noch unter der Kontrolle der syrischen Regierung. Das Regime hat auch in der Umgebung der Stadt noch Stützpunkte und kontrolliert den Flughafen in Qamishli (International Crisis Group, 8. Mai 2014). In den Jahren seit dem Ausbruch des Krieges kam es zu Kämpfen in den unterschiedlichsten Konstellationen: Zwischen den Kämpfern der YPG und dem Regime, zwischen der Freien Syrischen Armee und der YPG, zwischen islamistischen Kräften gegen Milizen des Regimes und der YPG sowie auch unter den verschiedenen kurdischen Gruppen. In den letzten Monaten rückten die Milizen der Terrororganisation IS bis zwanzig Kilometer auf Qamishli vor, was neue Vertriebungen in der Region auslöste (ARD, 3. November 2014; Kurdwatch).

Auf der Karte von Agathocle de Syracuse vom 19. Juni 2015 wird gezeigt, dass die Regierung, das heisst die syrische Armee und die Milizen der National Defense Forces, den Flughafen und das Quartier östlich des Flughafens und einen Korridor hin zur türkischen Grenze unter ihrer Kontrolle hat. Ein Syrienexperte schrieb am 9. September 2015, dass sich die Situation sehr schnell ändert. Er geht davon aus, dass die Regimeanhänger die Gebiete von Siyahie bis zum Flughafen und den Grenzübergang Nusaybin zur Türkei, unter ihrer Kontrolle haben. Siyahie / Seyahi / Syahee / Siyahi (=touristisch) ist eine Strasse im Zentrum von Qamishli. Kurdwatch dokumentierte Ende Juni 2015 weitere Gefechte zwischen syrischen Truppen und der YPG in Qamishli.» Quelle: SFH-Schnellrecherche, Syrien: Qamishli / Reservisten, 10. September 2015.

Kämpfe zwischen YPG, National Defense Forces, Regime und dem IS in und um Qamishli:

UN Human Rights Council, 13. August 2014:

«Renewed violence has been reported in Ayn al-Arab (Aleppo) as ISIS launched an offensive using advanced weapons seized in Iraq. **Sporadic clashes between YPG and local National Defence Forces were reported in the cities of Qamishli and Al Hasakah.**» Quelle: UN Human Rights Council, Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 13. August 2014:
www.refworld.org/docid/53fed8134.html.

Understanding War, 9. August 2014:

«The military arm of the de-facto independent Kurdish PYD party, the YPG, is in control of much of the province's countryside and capitalizes on local support from Christian and Arab tribal elements to defend against ISIS incursions. The

Kurdish Asayish security forces in charge of maintaining control inside city centers also coordinate locally with the regime's NDF militias, which include units of Arab tribesmen from the al-Sharabiyin and al-Tay tribes in addition to elements of Christian militias. **At the time of the fall of Mosul, the Syrian regime maintained control of the Qamishli airport and three hardened military bases throughout the province in addition to maintaining internal control within the major cities of Hasaka and Qamishli.** The provincial capital of Hasaka City has remained under joint control between Syrian regime and Kurdish forces, each of which maintain control over different neighborhoods with coordination to ensure service provision and quality of life within the city.

Rather than targeting these regime enclaves, **ISIS operations within the province throughout June and early July were largely directed against YPG forces in the countryside surrounding the cities of Ras al-Ayn and Qamishli on the Turkish border.** In these zones, small units of ISIS fighters operating in strategically located villages regularly contested terrain held by Kurdish YPG forces in the countryside and maintained limited pressure on regime and YPG resupply lines to Hasaka city. **ISIS forces also leveraged support from local Arab tribal elements, including the Sharabia tribe, a local rival to the YPG-allied Shaamar tribe.** The most significant ISIS stronghold in the province's northern countryside is located at **Tel Hamis deep within the countryside northeast of Hasaka City, which ISIS assumed firm control after successfully repulsing an attempt by the YPG to seize the village in early January 2014.** South of the city, it is assessed that the ISIS stronghold at ash-Shad-dadi continues to serve as a command headquarters for ISIS forces throughout eastern Syria in addition to facilitating cross-border lines of communication and transit into Iraq's Ninewa province.

This ISIS activity in the Hasaka countryside focused on maintaining lines of communication that traverse the province in addition to creating sufficient operating room for ISIS forces to mobilize on other fronts. However, ISIS forces also conducted initial shaping operations to isolate Hasaka city from its flow of supplies from Qamishli to the north. ISIS targeted the areas surrounding Qamishli Airport with Grad rockets and conducted kidnappings of several bus passengers on the Hasaka-Qamishli road in late June. ISIS forces also continued to contest the towns of Tal Ma'arof, Kharab al-A'skar, and Tel Alo in the YPG-controlled countryside south of Qamishli throughout July. Interdicting a second major supply line to Hasaka City, ISIS has pressured YPG forces along the Ras al-Ayn – Hasaka road, targeting YPG forces in the vicinity of Tel Tamir, a town strategically located at the junction of two of the province's major highways. An IED detonated in a car along the road between Hasaka City and Tel Tamir on July 3, killing a PYD council member and a member of the town's Popular Council. In addition, an ISIS SVBIED reportedly disguised as a truck bringing supplies to the area targeted a YPG camp just northwest of Tel Tamir on the road to Ras al-Ayn on July 13, killing eight. While limited in scope, these attacks in the weeks prior to the attack on Sinjar demonstrate the ability of ISIS to penetrate deep into YPG-controlled territory in zones likely marked for future incorporation into the Islamic State.» Quelle: Understanding War, ISIS Works to Merge its Northern Front across Iraq and Syria, 9. August 2014:

www.understandingwar.org/article/isis-works-merge-its-northern-front-across-iraq-and-syria#sthash.0qYKauLu.dpuf.

Kurdwatch, 10. Dezember 2014:

*«At the end of November, **the Syrian regime began forming new Arab militias. They are to cooperate with both the Democratic Union Party's (PYD) People's Defense Units (YPG) and the National Defense Forces.** The National Defense Forces are also regime-affiliated militias comprised of Arab tribe members. Some of the new militias are to be trained in Lebanon with Hezbollah fighters. In early November the Syrian president Bashar al-Assad received Arab tribal leaders and representatives of Christian groups from al-Hasakah province in Damascus. They demanded to form their own militias in order to stem the PYD's power in the Kurdish regions. According to KurdWatch information, the president indicated that the supremacy of the PYD was not up for discussion. At the same time, however, he reportedly approved the formation of new military forces as long as these forces also cooperate with the PYD.»* Quelle: Kurdwatch, Al-Qamishli: Syrian regime forms new militias, 10. Dezember 2014: www.kurdwatch.org/index.php?aid=3291&z=en&cure=1016.

Situationsanalyse des UNHCR, Oktober 2014:

*«**Nearly all parts of the country are now embroiled in violence, which is playing out between different actors in partially overlapping conflicts and is exacerbated by the participation of foreign fighters on all sides.** Fighting between the Syrian government forces and an array of anti-government armed groups continues unabated. **In parallel, the group "Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham" (hereafter ISIS) has consolidated control over significant areas in northern and north-eastern Syria and engages in frequent armed confrontations with anti-government armed groups, Kurdish forces (People's Protection Units, YPG) as well as government forces. The launch of airstrikes against ISIS targets as of 23 September 2014 has added an additional layer of complexity to the conflict.** As international efforts to find a political solution to the Syria situation have so far not been successful, the conflict, continues to cause further civilian casualties, displacement and destruction of the country's infrastructure.*

*At the time of writing, government forces control large parts of the country's western and central areas (Latakia, Tartous, Hama and Homs governorates), the capital Damascus and most of its environs and the southern governorate of Suweida, in addition to the road links between these areas. **ISIS has, as of mid-2014, consolidated its hold over a largely contiguous stretch of territory in mainly northern and north-eastern Syria (as well as large areas in neighbouring Iraq), including the eastern Aleppo countryside, Raqqa, Deir Ez-Zour and southern Hassakeh governorates.**»* Quelle: UN High Commissioner for Refugees, International Protection Considerations with regard to people fleeing the Syrian Arab Republic, Update III, Oktober 2014: www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1930_1414506190_544e446d4.pdf.