

Schnellrecherche der SFH-Länderanalyse vom 5. November 2015 zu Syrien: Rekrutierung durch die syrische Armee in den von der PYD verwalteten Gebieten

Fragen an die SFH-Länderanalyse:

- Kooperation syrisches Regime mit der PYD
- Präsenz der syrischen Armee in den von der PYD verwalteten Gebiete
- Einberufung in die syrische Armee in den von der PYD verwalteten Gebiete

Die Informationen beruhen auf einer zeitlich begrenzten Recherche (Schnellrecherche) in öffentlich zugänglichen Dokumenten, die uns derzeit zur Verfügung stehen sowie auf den Informationen einer sachkundigen Kontaktperson.

1 Kooperation des syrischen Regimes mit der PYD

Machtübernahme der PYD. Nach dem Ausbruch des Krieges in Syrien hat das syrische Regime die kurdischen Gebiete vor massiven Angriffen verschont und Regierungstruppen aus dem Gebiet abgezogen, um sie andernorts einzusetzen. Die *Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat* (PYD), die der PKK nahestehende Partei in Syrien, füllte das Machtvakuum und vertrieb im Juli 2012 in den grössten kurdischen Städten syrische Beamte aus den Büros, die syrischen Fahnen wurden entfernt und diejenigen der PYD gehisst. Die PYD übernahm die Kontrolle in den Städten Ayn al-Arab (Kobane), Amouda, Al-Malikiyah (Derik), Afrin und Jinderes. In Al-Malikiyah kam es gemäss der *International Crisis Group* (ICG) zu Kämpfen, in Afrin und Kobane zog sich die syrische Polizei kampfflos zurück (ICG, 2013).

Auch seit der Ausrufung der Übergangsverwaltung *Rojava* (Westkurdistan) in den drei von der PYD geführten «Kantonen» im November 2013 und nach der Etablierung der *Democratic Autonomous Administration* am 21. Januar 2014 des Kantons Jazeera (Cizîre) wird die PYD-Verwaltung vom syrischen Regime unterstützt: die Löhne für Staatsangestellte werden bezahlt und Behörden werden von syrischen Beamten geleitet (ICG, 2014).

Syrische Beamte punktuell weiterhin in der Verwaltung tätig. Ein von der SFH am 28. Oktober 2015 telefonisch kontaktierter Syrienexperte meint, dass die drei von ihm kontaktierten Personen in Al-Malikiyah davon ausgehen, dass vereinzelt immer noch syrische Beamte in der Verwaltung in Al-Malikiyah tätig sind. Diese würden sich jedoch im Hintergrund halten. Wie an anderen Orten auch, hänge die Präsenz von Beamten des syrischen Regimes auch von individuellen Umständen der einzelnen Personen und ihrer Vernetzung ab. So könne der Einfluss oder die Anzahl syrischer Beamter von Institution zu Institution und von Quartier zu Quartier variieren.

Innerkurdische Kritik an der PYD. Die kurdischen Parteien, welche nicht auf der Seite der PYD stehen, kritisieren die PYD für die Zusammenarbeit / Kooperation mit dem syrischen Regime. Die kurdischen Gegner und Rivalen der PYD sind diejenigen

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kurdischen Parteien, die der KDP (*Kurdistan Democratic Party*) nahe stehen und die unter der Schirmherrschaft von Masoud Barzani, dem bis August 2015 offiziell amtierenden Präsidenten der KRG-Region (*Kurdistan Regional Government*) im *Kurdistan National Council* zusammengebracht wurden (ICG, 2013 und 2014).

International Crisis Group, 2013:

«As Syria's conflict has expanded, the population in majority-Kurd areas has remained relatively insulated. Keeping a lower profile, it has been spared the brunt of regime attacks; over time, security forces withdrew to concentrate elsewhere. Kurdish groups stepped in to replace them: to stake out zones of influence, protect their respective areas, provide essential services and ensure an improved status for the community in a post-Assad Syria. Big gains could be reaped, yet cannot be taken for granted. Kurdish aspirations remain at the mercy of internal feuds, hostility with Arabs (evidenced by recent clashes) and regional rivalries over the Kurdish question.» Quelle: *International Crisis Group*, *Syria's Kurds: A Struggle Within a Struggle*, 22. Januar 2013, S. i:

www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Syria/136-syrias-kurds-a-struggle-within-a-struggle.pdf.

«What is currently (and largely as a result of the ongoing conflict) the most influential of these parties, the *Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat (Democratic Union Party, PYD)*, also has been the most reluctant to confront the regime, prompting charges of collusion. Well-organised, trained and armed, it is a Syrian Kurdish offshoot of the *PKK (the Kurdistan Workers' Party)*, the main Kurdish rebel group in Turkey. Shortly after the uprising broke out, the PYD, which had been encamped with the *PKK* in northern Iraq's mountains, returned to Syria, bringing along a contingent of fighters. In July 2012, it took advantage of the regime security forces' partial withdrawal from Kurdish areas to firmly establish its political and security presence, ousting government officials from municipal buildings in at least five of its strongholds and replacing Syrian flags with its own. In so doing, it openly asserted itself as the authority in charge of state institutions in most predominantly Kurdish towns.

The PYD's main competitors are a motley group of small Kurdish parties, several of which have close ties with Iraqi Kurdish groups. Under the patronage of Masoud Barzani, president of the *Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)* in Iraq and head of the *Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)*, over a dozen of these parties coalesced in the *Kurdistan National Council (KNC)* in October 2011. This alliance has been the only effective Kurdish political rival to the PYD, even as internal divisions and the absence of a fighting force inside Syria have reduced its potential as an effective counterweight. Still, by creating a security and political vacuum in Kurdish areas, Syria's conflict has prompted intensifying competition between these two main trends.» Quelle: *International Crisis Group*, *Syria's Kurds: A Struggle Within a Struggle*, 22. Januar 2013, S. iii:

www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Syria/136-syrias-kurds-a-struggle-within-a-struggle.pdf.

«The **PYD's real opportunity to push forward** – and push the regime aside – came in July 2012, when it **took over government buildings in the Kurdish areas** in a demonstration of both strength and independence. A person with close ties to the PYD said: **We told the authorities in our cities they had 24 hours to leave** or we would force them out. The police left Afrin and Kobane [Ayn al-Arab] with no problem, **but in Derek [Al-Malikiyah] they left only after some fighting**. We created a committee to protect Assyrians, Arabs and others. We took over gas stations and started selling gas and giving the engineers their salaries. So the system hasn't collapsed; **it's just that the PYD is now in charge of it.**» Quelle: International Crisis Group, Syria's Kurds: A Struggle Within a Struggle, 22. Januar 2013, S. 15:

www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Syria/136-syrias-kurds-a-struggle-within-a-struggle.pdf.

«As opposition armed groups surged in non-Kurdish areas of northern Syria, **the PYD ousted government officials from municipal buildings in at least five of its strongholds** – Ayn al-Arab (Kobane in Kurdish), Amouda, Al-Malikiyah (Derek), Afrin and Jinderes – replacing Syrian flags with its own. Accordingly, the PYD, which already had emerged as the foremost Kurdish group in the country, openly asserted itself as the authority in charge of state institutions in most Kurdish towns.» Quelle: International Crisis Group, Syria's Kurds: A Struggle Within a Struggle, 22. Januar 2013, S. 3:

www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Syria/136-syrias-kurds-a-struggle-within-a-struggle.pdf.

International Crisis Group, 2014:

«**Their principal players, the Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat, PYD) and its armed wing, the People's Protection Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel, YPG), now dominate three large, non-contiguous enclaves of Kurdish-majority territory along the Turkish border, over which the PYD proclaimed in November 2013 the transitional administration of Rojava (Western Kurdistan).** Kurdish governance is unprecedented in Syria and for the PYD, an offshoot of the Turkish Kurdish insurgent movement PKK, from which it draws ideological, organisational and military support. But it is unclear whether this is a first step toward stability and the Kurdish aspiration for national recognition, or merely a respite while the civil war focuses elsewhere. The PYD alone will not determine the fate of Syria's north, but it could greatly increase its chances by broadening its popular appeal and cooperating with other local forces. **For all its successes, the PYD's rise is in no small part illusory, attributable less to its own prowess than to its links with other regional forces. Perhaps most important is its de facto alliance with the regime, which handed territories over to it while continuing to give material support to those territories.**» Quelle: International Crisis Group, Flight of Icarus? The PYD's Precarious Rise in Syria Middle East Report N°151, 8. Mai 2014, S. i:

www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Syria/151-flight-of-icarus-the-pyd-s-precarious-rise-in-syria.pdf.

«As the PYD expanded its control in Kurdish populated areas, regime forces have maintained a presence in the largest enclaves nominally under the party's control, most notably Qamishli and Hassakah. Damascus pulled back most of its security personnel but kept government services under its charge; for example, it continues to pay salaries to state employees and run administrative offices. Far from leaving these functions to the PYD, it has centralised them, giving it an important edge in relations. A Qamishli resident and teacher on the state payroll, said all residents in the surrounding areas now can collect their salaries in two cities only: **Now we collect our salaries in Qamishli and Hassakah, where the regime is still present.** If the regime takes back these cities [militarily] and cuts the salaries [of state employees] for the rest of the Kurdish populated areas, I don't see how the PYD project could continue in Syria.» Quelle: International Crisis Group, Flight of Icarus? The PYD's Precarious Rise in Syria Middle East Report N°151, 8. Mai 2014, S. 9-10: www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Syria/151-flight-of-icarus-the-pyd-s-precarious-rise-in-syria.pdf.

«40. For an illustrative map, see Appendix B. **In the Jazeera region, regime security forces remain outside Qamishli, on the road from Hassakah to Deir-ez-Zor. Regime-affiliated personnel also are at Qamishli airport and Rumeilan's oil field.** Crisis Group observation, Qamishli, December 2013. **Kurdish critics of the PYD are quick to denounce this de facto cooperation. A Kurdish resident of Qamishli said, "Damascus still pays the salaries of state employees. A Syrian army division is still present outside Qamishli and another in Hassakah. The regime uses Qamishli airport and controls Rumeilan's oil-field [in Hasakah]. How can the PYD claim it has established a Kurdish administration?"**. Crisis Group interview, Qamishli, 3 December 2013.

41. **The state apparatus is unchanged since the foundation of the Rojava administration. In al-Jazeera region, for instance, as YPG forces took over, Damascus continued paying the salaries of school teachers and civil servants. When the PYD moved to pay state employees dismissed due to their anti-regime stand, Damascus eventually reinstated them in their positions and put them back on the payroll, to preserve state functions as its exclusive prerogative.** Crisis Group interview, Qamishli, February 2014. **School studies remain the same, according to a Qamishli teacher: "High school students still study curriculums approved by the Baath party, as they were doing four years ago".** Crisis Group interview, Qamishli, 4 April 2014.» Quelle: International Crisis Group, Flight of Icarus? The PYD's Precarious Rise in Syria Middle East Report N°151, 8. Mai 2014, Fussnoten 40 und 41, S. 9-10: www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Syria/151-flight-of-icarus-the-pyd-s-precarious-rise-in-syria.pdf.

2 Präsenz der syrischen Armee in den von der PYD verwalteten Gebiete

Syrische Truppen bleiben in Jazeera. Für die Sicherheit im Kanton Jazeera (Cizîre) ist zwar der bewaffnete Flügel der PYD, die YPG (*Yekîneyên Parastina*) zuständig, doch das syrische Regime blieb in den grössten Enklaven mit seinen Truppen präsent.

3 Rekrutierung in die syrische Armee in den von der PYD verwalteten Gebieten

Ob die syrische Armee heute noch (November 2015) in den von der PYD verwalteten Gebieten Soldaten rekrutiert ist umstritten. Verschiedene Quellen weisen darauf hin, dass in den von der syrischen Armee kontrollierten Gebieten in Al-Hasaka und Al-Qamishli das syrische Regime auch nach der Ausrufung des Kantons Jazeera noch Soldaten rekrutierte.

Der Syrienexperte ging am 28. Oktober 2015 davon aus, dass das syrische Regime in den Städten Al-Hasaka und Al-Qamishli auch nach der Ausrufung der *Democratic Autonomous Administration* des Kantons Jazeera (Cizîre) am 21. Januar 2014 noch Soldaten für die syrische Armee rekrutierte. *Kurdwatch* berichtete im Dezember 2013 über die Rekrutierung von Kurden in die syrische Armee in Al-Qamishli.

Ob das syrische Regime heute noch Soldaten in den von der PYD verwalteten Gebieten rekrutiert, konnte im Rahmen der Recherche nicht geklärt werden. Auch im Bericht des *Danish Immigration Service* wird darauf hingewiesen, dass das syrische Regime in den Gebieten, wo das Regime die Kontrolle hat, in den Militärdienst rekrutiert, das würde demnach auch Al-Hasaka und Al-Qamishli betreffen. An anderer Stelle wird vom *Danish Immigration Service* darauf hingewiesen, dass in den von der PYD kontrollierten Gebieten das syrische Regime nicht in die Armee rekrutiert. Hier muss jedoch festgestellt werden, dass der zeitliche Rahmen, ab wann das so sein soll, nicht ersichtlich ist. Die *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik* beschreibt, dass die PYD wie die anderen Akteure in Syrien auch temporäre Allianzen und Kooperationen führt, die schnell wieder aufgelöst werden können, weshalb der zeitliche Rahmen immer von Bedeutung ist.

Kurdwatch, Dezember 2013:

«Al-Qamishli: Resistance inside recruitment camp, *Kurdwatch* December 27, 2013 - **On December 20, 2013, shots were exchanged in a Syrian army recruitment camp two kilometers south of the al-Qamishli airport. Not long thereafter, several wounded were admitted to the state hospital in al-Qamishli. It is presumed that recruits attempted to desert the camp. According to several sources the regime had promised amnesty to recruits who had failed to appear for military service without authorization should they voluntarily surrender. In addition, their military service was to be performed only in secure areas. Several hundred people reportedly responded to the call. When, contrary to assurances given, recruits were to be sent to the fiercely contested city of Dair az-Zaur, several dozen people allegedly put up resistance.**»
Quelle: *Kurdwatch*, Al-Qamishli: Resistance inside recruitment camp, 27. Dezember 2013: <http://kurdwatch.org/statistics/index.php?aid=2991&z=en&cure=1009>.

Danish Immigration Service, September 2015:

«The government only recruits **people in the areas under its control.**» Quelle: *Danish Immigration Service*, Syria, Update on Military Service, Mandatory Self Defence Duty and Recruitment to the YPG, September 2015, S. 10:
www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/D2CD3A2F-402C-439C-9CD3-62EA255ED546/0/SyrienFFMrapport2015.pdf.

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Mai 2015:

«Insgesamt ist zu beobachten, dass sich im syrischen Krieg Allianzen sehr flexibel verschieben, da anscheinend ein realpolitisches Nullsummenspiel betrieben wird. Darin versucht jeder Akteur, sein eigenes Kontrollgebiet zu behalten oder auszuweiten, was zur Bildung opportunistischer, temporärer Allianzen und Kooperationen führt, die relativ schnell wieder aufgelöst werden können.» Quelle: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Der Aufschwung kurdischer Politik, Mai 2015, S. 45:

www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/studien/2015_S10_srt.pdf.