

Schnellrecherche der SFH-Länderanalyse vom 10. September 2015 zu Syrien: Qamishli / Reservisten

Fragen an die SFH-Länderanalyse:

- Haben die Regierungstruppen in der Stadt Qamishli im Quartier Siryan eine Sicherheitszone eingerichtet?
- Bekommen alle Personen, welche bereits im Militärdienst gedient haben danach eine Reservistenkarte?
- Wurde im Jahr 2010 der reguläre Militärdienst von 2 ½ Jahren auf 1 ½ Jahre reduziert?

Die Informationen beruhen auf einer zeitlich begrenzten Recherche (Schnellrecherche) in öffentlich zugänglichen Dokumenten, die uns derzeit zur Verfügung stehen sowie auf den Informationen von sachkundigen Kontaktpersonen.

1 Haben die Regierungstruppen in der Stadt Qamishli im Quartier Siryan eine Sicherheitszone eingerichtet?

Wie bereits in der Schnellrecherche vom 22. Januar 2015 dargelegt, ist Qamishli eine multiethnische Stadt und gehört zur Provinz al-Hasaka im Nordosten Syriens an der Grenze zur Türkei. Die Sicherheitssituation in Qamishli ist komplex. Es handelt sich um die grösste Stadt in den kurdischen Gebieten, die von Kurden, Arabern, Assyriern und Alewiten bewohnt ist (*International Crisis Group*, 22. Januar 2013). Am 21. Januar 2014 wurde die *Democratic Autonomous Administration* des Kantons Cizîre (Jazeera) ausgerufen und einige Tage später wurde Qamishli zu dessen Hauptstadt bestimmt (ANF, 26. Januar 2014).

Einige Quartiere sind in der Hand der PKK nahestehenden *Democratic Union Party* (PYD) und deren bewaffnetem Arm *People's Defence Corps* (YPG). Andere stehen immer noch unter der Kontrolle der syrischen Regierung. Das Regime hat auch in der Umgebung der Stadt noch Stützpunkte und kontrolliert den Flughafen in Qamishli (*International Crisis Group*, 8. Mai 2014). In den Jahren seit dem Ausbruch des Krieges kam es zu Kämpfen in den unterschiedlichsten Konstellationen: Zwischen den Kämpfern der YPG und dem Regime, zwischen der Freien Syrischen Armee und der YPG, zwischen islamistischen Kräften gegen Milizen des Regimes und der YPG sowie auch unter den verschiedenen kurdischen Gruppen. In den letzten Monaten rückten die Milizen der Terrororganisation IS bis zwanzig Kilometer auf Qamishli vor, was neue Vertreibungen in der Region auslöste (ARD, 3. November 2014; *Kurdwatch*).

Auf der Karte von *Agathocle de Syracuse* vom 19. Juni 2015 wird gezeigt, dass die Regierung, das heisst die syrische Armee und die Milizen der *National Defense Forces*, den Flughafen und das Quartier östlich des Flughafens und einen Korridor hin zur türkischen Grenze unter ihrer Kontrolle hat. Ein *Syrienexperte* schrieb am 9. September 2015, dass sich die Situation sehr schnell ändert. Er geht davon aus, dass die Regimeanhänger die Gebiete von Siyahie bis zum Flughafen und den Grenzübergang

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
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Nusaybin zur Türkei, unter ihrer Kontrolle haben. Siyahie / Seyahi / Syahee / Siyahi (=touristisch) ist eine Strasse im Zentrum von Qamishli. *Kurdwatch* dokumentierte Ende Juni 2015 weitere Gefechte zwischen syrischen Truppen und der YPG in Qamishli.

Agathocle de Syracuse, 19. Juni 2015:



Quelle: Agathocle de Syracuse, The situation in Qamishli city, 19. Juni 2015:
www.agathocledesyracuse.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Qamishli-19-June-2015.jpg.

Al Syahee, Qamishli, Suriye **Harita** Sokak haritasını göster **Arazi** Sokak haritasında arazi göster **Uydu** Uydu görüntülerini göster **Karma** Görüntüleri sokak adlarıyla göster



Quelle:
www.maps7.com/tr/Al%20Syahee,%20Qamishli,%20Suriye.html#.VfFspP6KBDM

Kurdwatch, 24. Juni 2015:

«**Al-Qamishli: Skirmishes between YPG and pro-regime militia:** During the night of June 21 to June 22 2015, skirmishes broke out between fighters for the Democratic Union Party's (PYD) People's Defense Units (YPG) and the National Defense Army, which is loyal to the regime. A civilian was killed in the confrontations. Background information as well as information on any additional victims is not available.» Quelle: Kurdwatch, Al-Qamishli: Skirmishes between YPG and pro-regime militia, 24. Juni 2015: www.kurdwatch.org/?aid=3466&z=en.

Syrien-Experte an die SFH, 9. September 2015:

«Die Assads Soldaten besetzen zwei Gebiete in Qamishli, das erste Gebiet ist von Siyahie Quartier bis Flughafen und das andere Gebiet ist an der Grenze zur Türkei bei Nusaybin. IN: Syrien-Experte an die SFH, 9. September 2015.

Informationen aus der Schnellrecherche vom 22. Januar 2015:

International Crisis Group, 22. Januar 2013:

«**Qamishli has Arabs, Assyrians and Alawites** [who have moved there as a result of civil service employment], so it's much more complicated than Afrin and Kobane, which are Kurdish cities and PYD strongholds. **Part of Qamishli, called Mahal al-Gharbiya [the Western Quarter], is in PYD hands; the city also has a strong regime presence and all other Kurdish parties have their headquarters in Qamishli.** Turkey and Barzani won't let Qamishli fall into the PYD's hands because of the oil in the province. This is why we could see a fight between the regime and the people or among Kurdish parties themselves in Qamishli.» Quelle: International Crisis Group, Syria's Kurds: A Struggle Within a Struggle, 22. Januar 2013: [www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Syria/136-syrias-kurds-a-struggle-within-a-struggle.pdf](http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Syria/136-syrias-kurds-a-struggle-within-a-struggle.pdf).

ANF, 26. Januar 2014:

«**The Democratic Autonomous Administration of the Cizîre (Jazeera) Canton has held its first meeting after its declaration on 21 January.** At this meeting the town of Qamişlo ((Qamishli) was accepted as the capital, while meetings of the administration will take place in Amûde (Adaniya). (...) Hiso said they had decided on Qamişlo as the capital of the canton, while the canton administration would continue to be based in Amûde and meetings would be held there.» Quelle: ANF: Qamishli capital, but meetings in Amuda, 26. Januar 2014: <http://vvanwilgenburg.blogspot.com/2014/01/anf-qamishli-capital-but-meetings-in.html>.

International Crisis Group, 8. Mai 2014:

«**As the PYD expanded its control in Kurdish populated areas, regime forces have maintained a presence in the largest enclaves nominally under the party's control, most notably Qamishli and Hassakah.** Damascus pulled back most of its security personnel but **kept government services under its charge; for example, it continues to pay salaries to state employees and run administrative offices.** Far from

leaving these functions to the PYD, it has centralised them, giving it an important edge in relations. (...) In the al-Jazeera region, YPG coordinates with the National Defence Army (Jaysh al-Difaa al-Watani), a pro-regime formation of Arab tribesmen from Qamishli and Hassakah. Qamishli residents say it is headed by the local tribal leader, Mohammed al-Faris, and has 500 members from the al-Sharabiyin and al-Taie tribes. YPG also cooperates with the Syriac military wing, Suturo (al-suturo) in Qamishli, Malikiyah, Hassakeh and Qataniyah. Crisis Group observation, Qamishli, March 2014. Al-Suturo considers itself anti-regime, but believes that de facto cooperation with the regime is justified in the best interests of the people of the region. (...) **In the Jazeera region, regime security forces remain outside Qamishli, on the road from Hassakah to Deir-ez-Zor. Regime-affiliated personnel also are at Qamishli airport and Rumeilan's oil field.**» Quelle: International Crisis Group, Flight of Icarus? The PYD's Precarious Rise in Syria Middle East Report N°151, 8. Mai 2014:

www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Syria/151-flight-of-icarus-the-pyd-s-precarious-rise-in-syria.pdf.

Eroberungen von Gebieten in der Nähe der Stadt Qamishli durch den IS:

ARD, 3. November 2014:

«Verlassene Dörfer in der Nähe von Qamishli, der Provinzhauptstadt der Kurdenregion im syrisch-irakischen Grenzgebiet. Fluchtartig geräumte Häuser. Hals über Kopf hatten sich die Bewohner in Sicherheit gebracht, **als der IS auf Qamishli vorrückte. 20 Kilometer vor der Stadt haben die Kurdenmilizen die Terroristen aufgehalten.** Im September eroberten sie sogar einige Ortschaften zurück. Aber die Kurden klagen: Niemand helfe ihnen.» Quelle: ARD, Der IS vor Qamishli, 3. November 2014:

www.daserste.de/information/politik-weltgeschehen/mittagsmagazin/sendung/2014/kurden-jesiden-is-qamishli-irak-syrien-tuerkei-100.html.

Kurdwatch, 31. Dezember 2014:

«In mid-December 2014, the body of sixteen-year-old 'Afan Dschum'a al-'Abusch was found in a field near his home village of Scharmukh, twenty kilometers south of al-Qamischli. **Since the beginning of the civil war, the area has alternately been controlled by the regime, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the Jabhat an-Nusra, the Islamic State (IS), and regime affiliated Arab militias.** Relatives of the deceased, as well as Arab activists and the Syrian National Coalition have accused the PKK of kidnapping and killing the Arab boy. By contrast, the Democratic Union Party's (PYD) People's Defense Units (YPG) have explained that al-'Abusch was killed by a mine explosion. Photos of the deceased exhibit injuries that would, in fact, point to a mine explosion.» Quelle: Kurdwatch, Al-Qamishli: Body of minor found, 31. Dezember 2014: www.kurdwatch.org/index.php?aid=3310&z=en&cure=1016.

Kurdwatch, 31. Dezember 2014:

«On December 16, 2014, two employees of the Iraqi-Kurdish television station Rûdaw, Farhad Hame and Mas'ud 'Aqil, as well as their vehicle disappeared without a trace east of al-Qamishli. The Asayiş, the security service of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), **explained to the relatives of the missing that the Islamic State (IS) had erected a checkpoint on the road and kidnapped the journalists.** However the

Asayiş itself has repeatedly kidnapped critical journalists, especially employees of Rûdaw. Hame was previously detained by the Asayiş on February 6, 2014.» Quelle: Kurdwatch, Al-Qamishli: Journalists missing, 31. Dezember 2014:
www.kurdwatch.org/index.php?aid=3309&z=en&cure=1016.

Kurdwatch, 28. Dezember 2014:

*«On December 23, 2014, fighters for the Islamic State (IS) began an offensive against the positions of the Democratic Union Party's (PYD) People's Defense Units (YPG) and the regime-affiliated National Defense Army in Abu Qasayib und Tall Ghazal. **At the very minimum, the IS captured Abu Qasayib, located twenty kilometers south of al-Qamishli.** Reliable information about the number of people killed is not available. The Syrian army shelled IS positions with surface-to-surface missiles.»* Quelle: Kurdwatch, Al-Qamishli: IS captures at least one village south of the city, 28. Dezember 2014: www.kurdwatch.org/index.php?aid=3304&z=en&cure=1016.

Kurdwatch, 31. Dezember 2014:

*«On December 26, 2014, **fighters for the Democratic Union Party's (PYD) People's Defense Units (YPG) were able to recapture the area around the village of Abu Qasayib, twenty kilometers south of al-Qamishli, with support from the Syrian army.** A few days earlier, the area had been captured by the Islamic State (IS) [\[further information\]](#). On December 27, PYD-supporters buried nine YPG fighters who were killed in the fighting.»* Quelle: Kurdwatch, Al-Qamishli: Nine YPG-fighters killed in recapture of Abu Qasayib, 31. Dezember 2014:
www.kurdwatch.org/index.php?aid=3314&z=en&cure=1016.

Kämpfe zwischen YPG, National Defense Forces, Regime und dem IS in und um Qamishli:

UN Human Rights Council, 13. August 2014:

*«Renewed violence has been reported in Ayn al-Arab (Aleppo) as ISIS launched an offensive using advanced weapons seized in Iraq. **Sporadic clashes between YPG and local National Defence Forces were reported in the cities of Qamishli and Al Hasakah.**»* Quelle: UN Human Rights Council, Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 13. August 2014:
www.refworld.org/docid/53fed8134.html.

Understanding War, 9. August 2014:

*«The **military arm of the de-facto independent Kurdish PYD party, the YPG, is in control of much of the province's countryside and capitalizes on local support from Christian and Arab tribal elements to defend against ISIS incursions.** The Kurdish Asayish security forces in charge of maintaining control inside city centers also coordinate locally with the regime's NDF militias, which include units of Arab tribesmen from the al-Sharabiyin and al-Tay tribes in addition to elements of Christian militias. **At the time of the fall of Mosul, the Syrian regime maintained control of the Qamishli airport and three hardened military bases throughout the province in addition to maintaining internal control within the major cities of Hasaka and***

Qamishli. The provincial capital of Hasaka City has remained under joint control between Syrian regime and Kurdish forces, each of which maintain control over different neighborhoods with coordination to ensure service provision and quality of life within the city.

Rather than targeting these regime enclaves, **ISIS operations within the province throughout June and early July were largely directed against YPG forces in the countryside surrounding the cities of Ras al-Ayn and Qamishli on the Turkish border.** In these zones, small units of ISIS fighters operating in strategically located villages regularly contested terrain held by Kurdish YPG forces in the countryside and maintained limited pressure on regime and YPG resupply lines to Hasaka city. **ISIS forces also leveraged support from local Arab tribal elements, including the Sharabia tribe, a local rival to the YPG-allied Shaamar tribe.** The most significant ISIS stronghold in the province's northern countryside is located at **Tel Hamis deep within the countryside northeast of Hasaka City, which ISIS assumed firm control after successfully repulsing an attempt by the YPG to seize the village in early January 2014.** South of the city, it is assessed that the ISIS stronghold at ash-Shad-dadi continues to serve as a command headquarters for ISIS forces throughout eastern Syria in addition to facilitating cross-border lines of communication and transit into Iraq's Ninewa province.

This ISIS activity in the Hasaka countryside focused on maintaining lines of communication that traverse the province in addition to creating sufficient operating room for ISIS forces to mobilize on other fronts. However, ISIS forces also conducted initial shaping operations to isolate Hasaka city from its flow of supplies from Qamishli to the north. ISIS targeted the areas surrounding Qamishli Airport with Grad rockets and conducted kidnappings of several bus passengers on the Hasaka-Qamishli road in late June. ISIS forces also continued to contest the towns of Tal Ma'arof, Kharab al-A'skar, and Tel Alo in the YPG-controlled countryside south of Qamishli throughout July. Interdicting a second major supply line to Hasaka City, ISIS has pressured YPG forces along the Ras al-Ayn – Hasaka road, targeting YPG forces in the vicinity of Tel Tamir, a town strategically located at the junction of two of the province's major highways. An IED detonated in a car along the road between Hasaka City and Tel Tamir on July 3, killing a PYD council member and a member of the town's Popular Council. In addition, an ISIS SVBIED reportedly disguised as a truck bringing supplies to the area targeted a YPG camp just northwest of Tel Tamir on the road to Ras al-Ayn on July 13, killing eight. While limited in scope, these attacks in the weeks prior to the attack on Sinjar demonstrate the ability of ISIS to penetrate deep into YPG-controlled territory in zones likely marked for future incorporation into the Islamic State.» Quelle: Understanding War, ISIS Works to Merge its Northern Front across Iraq and Syria, 9. August 2014:
www.understandingwar.org/article/isis-works-merge-its-northern-front-across-iraq-and-syria#sthash.0qYKauLu.dpuf.

Kurdwatch, 10. Dezember 2014:

«At the end of November, the Syrian regime began forming new Arab militias. They are to cooperate with both the Democratic Union Party's (PYD) People's Defense Units (YPG) and the National Defense Forces. The National Defense Forces are

also regime-affiliated militias comprised of Arab tribe members. Some of the new militias are to be trained in Lebanon with Hezbollah fighters. In early November the Syrian president Bashar al-Assad received Arab tribal leaders and representatives of Christian groups from al-Hasakah province in Damascus. They demanded to form their own militias in order to stem the PYD's power in the Kurdish regions. According to KurdWatch information, the president indicated that the supremacy of the PYD was not up for discussion. At the same time, however, he reportedly approved the formation of new military forces as long as these forces also cooperate with the PYD.» Quelle: Kurdwatch, Al-Qamishli: Syrian regime forms new militias, 10. Dezember 2014: www.kurdwatch.org/index.php?aid=3291&z=en&cure=1016.

Situationsanalyse des UNHCR, Oktober 2014:

«Nearly all parts of the country are now embroiled in violence, which is playing out between different actors in partially overlapping conflicts and is exacerbated by the participation of foreign fighters on all sides. Fighting between the Syrian government forces and an array of anti-government armed groups continues unabated. In parallel, the group “Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham” (hereafter ISIS) has consolidated control over significant areas in northern and north-eastern Syria and engages in frequent armed confrontations with anti-government armed groups, Kurdish forces (People’s Protection Units, YPG) as well as government forces. The launch of airstrikes against ISIS targets as of 23 September 2014 has added an additional layer of complexity to the conflict. As international efforts to find a political solution to the Syria situation have so far not been successful, the conflict, continues to cause further civilian casualties, displacement and destruction of the country’s infrastructure.

At the time of writing, government forces control large parts of the country’s western and central areas (Lattakia, Tartous, Hama and Homs governorates), the capital Damascus and most of its environs and the southern governorate of Suweida, in addition to the road links between these areas. **ISIS has, as of mid-2014, consolidated its hold over a largely contiguous stretch of territory in mainly northern and north-eastern Syria (as well as large areas in neighbouring Iraq), including the eastern Aleppo countryside, Raqqa, Deir Ez-Zour and southern Hassakeh governorates.**» Quelle: UN High Commissioner for Refugees, International Protection Considerations with regard to people fleeing the Syrian Arab Republic, Update III, Oktober 2014: www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1930_1414506190_544e446d4.pdf.

2 Bekommen alle Personen, welche bereits im Militärdienst gedient haben danach eine Reservistenkarte?

Gemäss eines von der SFH am 9. September 2015 kontaktierten *Syrienexperten* wird bei allen dienstleistenden Personen nach dem Militärdienst im Militärbüchlein festgehalten, dass sie nun als Reservisten abrufbar sein müssen. Das Militärbüchlein wird bei der ersten Einberufung in den Militärdienst ausgehändigt, alle Angaben über die Dienstzeit sind darin festgehalten (*US Department of State*, ohne Datum).

Gemäss der telefonischen Auskunft einer Kontaktperson vom 11. September 2014 im Zusammenhang mit einer anderen Anfrage an die SFH, wird im Militärbüchlein erwähnt, dass die Person nach dem obligatorischen Militärdienst jederzeit bereit sein muss, wieder aufgeboden und einberufen zu werden.

Syrien-Experte an die SFH, 9. September 2015:

«Ja Alle bekommen nachdem Militärdienst eine Karte oder ein Code (der Code wird durch Regierung Medien gerufen und der Person ist verpflichtet sich sofort zu melden).» Quelle: Syrien-Experte an die SFH, 9. September 2015.

US Department of State, ohne Datum:

*«Syrian males over the age of 18 must present themselves for the mandatory military service, and when they do, they receive Military Cards. **Syrian males keep this document after their discharge from the service and present it again when they are called for reserve. This document records the dates all events and duties of the bearer from the first day in military service until the time of discharge from duty. If this document is lost or unavailable, military statements can be obtained from the Mobilization Department.**»* Quelle: The United States Department of State, Country Reciprocity Schedule – Syria, ohne Datum:
<http://travel.state.gov/content/visas/english/fees/reciprocity-by-country/SY.html#docs>.

3 Wurde im Jahr 2010 der reguläre Militärdienst von 2 ½ Jahren auf 1 ½ Jahre reduziert?

Gemäss den Informationen auf der Seite von *Globalsecurity* wurde der Militärdienst im Jahr 2005 von 30 Monaten auf 24 Monate reduziert. 2009 erfolgte eine weitere Reduktion auf 21 Monate. Im März 2011 erliess Präsident Baschar al Assad das Dekret Nummer 35 womit der Militärdienst von 21 auf 18 Monate reduziert wurde (SFH, 30. Juli 2014; *Syrien-Experte*, 9. September 2015).

Globalsecurity, ohne Datum (Zugriff am 7. September 2015):

«The Syria had twice reduced the time of service – from 30 months to 24 months in 2005 and again to 21 months in 2009 – reportedly due in part to popular opposition to forced conscription. University students can postpone their military service until after graduation, a rule many college students take advantage of. In addition to only sons, men "infected with chronic disease or other maladies preventing the infected from exerting any efforts" are exempted. Expatriate Syrians can avoid conscription if they pay \$6,500, a sum reduced from \$15,000 in 2009.» Quelle: *Globalsecurity*, Military Personnel, ohne Datum (Zugriff am 7. September 2015):
www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/syria/personnel.html.

SFH, 30. Juli 2014:

«Im März 2011 erliess Präsident Assad das Dekret Nummer 35, wodurch der Militärdienst von 21 auf 18 Monate für diejenigen Männer reduziert wurde, die bis am

1. Juni 2011 mindestens die fünfte Klasse beendet hatten. Für diejenigen, die nicht die fünfte Klasse abgeschlossen haben, bleibt die Dienstzeit 21 Monate.» Quelle: SFH, Rekrutierung durch die Syrische Armee, 30. Juli 2014:
www.fluechtlingshilfe.ch/assets/herkunftslaender/mittlerer-osten-zentralasien/syrien/syrien-rekrutierung-durch-die-syrische-armee.pdf.

Syrien-Experte an die SFH, 9. September 2015:

«Der Militärdienst wurde auf 18 Monate reduziert.» Quelle: Syrien-Experte an die SFH, 9. September 2015.