

Schnellrecherche der SFH-Länderanalyse vom 22. Januar 2015 zu Syrien: Situation von alleinstehenden Frauen in der Stadt Qamishli

Frage an die SFH-Länderanalyse:

- Wie ist die Situation von alleinstehenden Frauen mit Kindern in Qamishli?

Die Informationen beruhen auf einer zeitlich begrenzten Recherche (Schnellrecherche) in öffentlich zugänglichen Dokumenten, die uns derzeit zur Verfügung stehen sowie auf den Informationen von einer sachkundigen Kontaktperson.

1 Frauen

Die Lage der Frauen in Syrien hat sich dramatisch verschlechtert. Tausende kamen ums Leben, viele wurden verhaftet, gefoltert oder erlitten sexuelle Gewalt. Vor allem Frauen ohne männlichen Schutz müssen einerseits alleine für ihre Familien aufkommen, andererseits sind sie dadurch verletzlicher und gefährdet, missbraucht und ausgebeutet zu werden. Auch Kinder leiden zu tausenden unter dem Krieg. Kindern kann auch Zwangsrekrutierung drohen.

Ein von der Schweizerischen Flüchtlingshilfe (SFH) kontaktierter Syrien-Experte teilte am 22. Januar 2015 mit, dass die Situation für alleinstehende junge Mädchen und Frauen auch in der Stadt Qamishli im Gouvernement al-Hasaka sehr schwierig sei. Er weist zudem darauf hin, dass es eine Rolle spielt, in welchem Quartier die jungen Frauen leben. Einige Quartiere werden von der *Democratic Union Party* (PYD), andere vom Assad-Regime und weitere von Milizen kontrolliert. In den von der PYD kontrollierten Gebieten wird über Zwangsrekrutierungen von Kindern gesprochen. (Vgl. Schnellrecherche der SFH vom 4. November 2014 zu Syrien: Verfolgung von PDKS-Anhängern durch die YPG, Kapitel 3 und Schnellrecherche der SFH-Länderanalyse vom 12. Januar 2015 zu Syrien: Kurdish Youth Movement, Kapitel 3)

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UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) benennt Frauen und Kinder explizit als besonders verletzlich und empfiehlt, dass den Frauen und Kindern ein Schutzstatus gemäss den Flüchtlingskonventionen gewährt wird.

UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Oktober 2014:

*«The situation of **women** has been dramatically affected by the ongoing conflict as they have become increasingly exposed to a range of violations from different parties in the conflict. Thousands of women have reportedly been killed as a result of shelling in civilian areas, the use of snipers, during raids and massacres. Others have been detained, taken hostage, subjected to torture and sexual or other violence, used as human shields or subjected to harsh interpretations of Shari'a law. **Women who have become the primary or sole caretakers for their families due to their male family members' injury or disability, detention, disappearance, death or participation in the conflict, face specific hardships in rebuilding their lives and caring for their families amidst increased risk of abuse and exploitation.***



Children are among those most affected by the conflict. More than 10,000 children have been killed as a result of crossfire, shelling and bombardment as well as in targeted violence such as sniper fire and summary executions and massacres. Many others have been injured, detained, abducted and traumatized. As at March 2014, 5.5 million children were reported to have been affected by the conflict, up from 2.3 million only one year earlier. Up to one million children live in hard-to-reach areas in Syria. More than half of Syria's school-aged children, 2.8 million, are reported to be out of school. Many children affected by the conflict have been or may be exposed to child labour, domestic violence and/or early and forced marriage. Reports document the recruitment of children for support functions and combat by various parties to the conflict, putting them at great risk of death, injury, trauma or torture. Child marriages and sexual violence emerged as a major concern among Syrian refugee populations, with devastating consequences for the education and health of Syrian girls.» (...)

«Risk Profiles

Where claims of asylum-seekers who have fled Syria are considered on an individual basis in accordance with established asylum or refugee status determination procedures, UNHCR considers that persons with any of the profiles below, or a combination thereof, are likely to be in need of international protection in the sense of the 1951 Convention, unless, of course, exclusion clauses would apply (see para 29). Family members or persons otherwise closely associated with persons in any of the profiles below are, depending on the individual circumstances of the case, also likely to be in need of international refugee protection. Where relevant, particular consideration needs to be given to any past persecution to which applicants for international protection may have been subjected.

***Women**, in particular women who are victim of or at risk of sexual violence, early and forced marriage, domestic violence, "honour crimes" or trafficking.*

***Children**, in particular children who are at risk of detention or have previously been detained; children victims of or at risk of underage and forced recruitment, sexual and domestic violence, child labour, trafficking, and systematic denial of access to education.» Quelle: UN High Commissioner for Refugees, International Protection Considerations with regard to people fleeing the Syrian Arab Republic, Update III, Oktober 2014:*

www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1930_1414506190_544e446d4.pdf.

2 Al-Qamishli – Sicherheitssituation

Kämpfe in unterschiedlichsten Konstellationen seit Kriegsausbruch. Qamishli ist eine multiethnische Stadt und gehört zur Provinz al-Hasaka im Nordosten Syriens an der Grenze zur Türkei. Die Sicherheitssituation in Qamishli ist komplex. Es handelt sich um die grösste Stadt in den kurdischen Gebieten, die von Kurden, Arabern, Assyriern und Alewiten bewohnt ist (*International Crisis Group*, 22. Januar 2013). Am 21. Januar 2014 wurde die *Democratic Autonomous Administration* des Kantons Cizîre (*Jazeera*) ausgerufen und einige Tage später wurde Qamishli zu dessen Hauptstadt bestimmt (*ANF*, 26. Januar 2014).

Einige Quartiere sind in der Hand der PKK nahestehenden *Democratic Union Party* (PYD) und deren bewaffnetem Arm *People's Defence Corps* (YPG). Andere stehen immer noch unter der Kontrolle der syrischen Regierung. Das Regime hat auch in der Umgebung der Stadt noch Stützpunkte und kontrolliert den Flughafen in Qamishli (*International Crisis Group*, 8. Mai 2014). In den Jahren seit dem Ausbruch des Krieges kam es zu Kämpfen in den unterschiedlichsten Konstellationen. Zwischen den Kämpfern der YPG und dem Regime, zwischen der Freien Syrischen Armee und der YPG, zwischen islamistischen Kräften gegen Milizen des Regimes und der YPG sowie auch unter den verschiedenen kurdischen Gruppen. In den letzten Monaten rückten die Milizen der Terrororganisation IS bis zwanzig Kilometer auf Qamishli vor, was neue Vertreibungen in der Region auslöste.

International Crisis Group, 22. Januar 2013:

«Qamishli has Arabs, Assyrians and Alawites [who have moved there as a result of civil service employment], so it's much more complicated than Afrin and Kobane, which are Kurdish cities and PYD strongholds. Part of Qamishli, called Mahal al-Gharbiya [the Western Quarter], is in PYD hands; the city also has a strong regime presence and all other Kurdish parties have their headquarters in Qamishli. Turkey and Barzani won't let Qamishli fall into the PYD's hands because of the oil in the province. This is why we could see a fight between the regime and the people or among Kurdish parties themselves in Qamishli.» Quelle: *International Crisis Group, Syria's Kurds: A Struggle Within a Struggle*, 22. Januar 2013:
[www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Syria/136-syrias-kurds-a-struggle-within-a-struggle.pdf](http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Syria/136-syrias-kurds-a-struggle-within-a-struggle.pdf).

ANF, 26. Januar 2014:

«The Democratic Autonomous Administration of the Cizîre (Jazeera) Canton has held its first meeting after its declaration on 21 January. At this meeting the town of Qamişlo ((Qamishli) was accepted as the capital, while meetings of the administration will take place in Amûde (Adaniya). (...) Hiso said they had decided on Qamişlo as the capital of the canton, while the canton administration would continue to be based in Amûde and meetings would be held there.» Quelle: ANF, Qamishli capital, but meetings in Amuda, 26. Januar 2014:
<http://vvanwilgenburg.blogspot.com/2014/01/anf-qamishli-capital-but-meetings-in.html>.

International Crisis Group, 8. Mai 2014:

«As the PYD expanded its control in Kurdish populated areas, regime forces have maintained a presence in the largest enclaves nominally under the party's control, most notably Qamishli and Hassakah. Damascus pulled back most of its security personnel but kept government services under its charge; for example, it continues to pay salaries to state employees and run administrative offices. Far from leaving these functions to the PYD, it has centralised them, giving it an important edge in relations. (...) In the al-Jazeera region, YPG coordinates with the National Defence Army (Jaysh al-Difaa al-Watani), a pro-regime formation of Arab tribesmen from Qamishli and Hassakah. Qamishli residents say it is headed by the local tribal leader,

Mohammed al-Faris, and has 500 members from the al-Sharabiyin and al-Taie tribes. YPG also cooperates with the Syriac military wing, Suturo (al-suturo) in Qamishli, Malikiyah, Hassakeh and Qataniyah. Crisis Group observation, Qamishli, March 2014. Al-Suturo considers itself anti-regime, but believes that de facto cooperation with the regime is justified in the best interests of the people of the region. (...) **In the Jazeera region, regime security forces remain outside Qamishli, on the road from Hassakah to Deir-ez-Zor. Regime-affiliated personnel also are at Qamishli airport and Rumeilan's oil field.**» Quelle: International Crisis Group, Flight of Icarus? The PYD's Precarious Rise in Syria Middle East Report N°151, 8. Mai 2014:
www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Syria/151-flight-of-icarus-the-pyd-s-precarious-rise-in-syria.pdf.

Eroberungen von Gebieten in der Nähe der Stadt Qamishli durch den IS:

ARD, 3. November 2014:

«Verlassene Dörfer in der Nähe von Qamishli, der Provinzhauptstadt der Kurdenregion im syrisch-irakischen Grenzgebiet. Fluchtartig geräumte Häuser. Hals über Kopf hatten sich die Bewohner in Sicherheit gebracht, **als der IS auf Qamishli vorrückte. 20 Kilometer vor der Stadt haben die Kurdenmilizen die Terroristen aufgehalten.** Im September eroberten sie sogar einige Ortschaften zurück. Aber die Kurden klagen: Niemand helfe ihnen.» Quelle: ARD, Der IS vor Qamishli, 3. November 2014:
www.daserste.de/information/politik-weltgeschehen/mittagsmagazin/sendung/2014/kurden-jesiden-is-qamishli-irak-syrien-tuerkei-100.html.

Kurdwatch, 31. Dezember 2014:

«In mid-December 2014, the body of sixteen-year-old 'Afan Dschum'a al-'Abusch was found in a field near his home village of Scharmukh, twenty kilometers south of al-Qamishli. **Since the beginning of the civil war, the area has alternately been controlled by the regime, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the Jabhat an-Nusra, the Islamic State (IS), and regime affiliated Arab militias.** Relatives of the deceased, as well as Arab activists and the Syrian National Coalition have accused the PKK of kidnapping and killing the Arab boy. By contrast, the Democratic Union Party's (PYD) People's Defense Units (YPG) have explained that al-'Abusch was killed by a mine explosion. Photos of the deceased exhibit injuries that would, in fact, point to a mine explosion.» Quelle: Kurdwatch, Al-Qamishli: Body of minor found, 31. Dezember 2014: www.kurdwatch.org/index.php?aid=3310&z=en&cure=1016.

Kurdwatch, 31. Dezember 2014:

«On December 16, 2014, two employees of the Iraqi-Kurdish television station Rûdaw, Farhad Hame and Mas'ud 'Aqil, as well as their vehicle disappeared without a trace east of al-Qamishli. The Asayiş, the security service of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), **explained to the relatives of the missing that the Islamic State (IS) had erected a checkpoint on the road and kidnapped the journalists.** However the Asayiş itself has repeatedly kidnapped critical journalists, especially employees of Rûdaw. Hame was previously detained by the Asayiş on February 6, 2014.» Quelle: Kurdwatch, Al-Qamishli: Journalists missing, 31. Dezember 2014:
www.kurdwatch.org/index.php?aid=3309&z=en&cure=1016.

Kurdwatch, 28. Dezember 2014:

«On December 23, 2014, fighters for the Islamic State (IS) began an offensive against the positions of the Democratic Union Party's (PYD) People's Defense Units (YPG) and the regime-affiliated National Defense Army in Abu Qasayib und Tall Ghazal. **At the very minimum, the IS captured Abu Qasayib, located twenty kilometers south of al-Qamishli.** Reliable information about the number of people killed is not available. The Syrian army shelled IS positions with surface-to-surface missiles.» Quelle: Kurdwatch, Al-Qamishli: IS captures at least one village south of the city, 28. Dezember 2014: www.kurdwatch.org/index.php?aid=3304&z=en&cure=1016.

Kurdwatch, 28. Dezember 2014:

«On December 26, 2014, **fighters for the Democratic Union Party's (PYD) People's Defense Units (YPG) were able to recapture the area around the village of Abu Qasayib, twenty kilometers south of al-Qamishli, with support from the Syrian army.** A few days earlier, the area had been captured by the Islamic State (IS) [\[further information\]](#). On December 27, PYD-supporters buried nine YPG fighters who were killed in the fighting.» Quelle: Kurdwatch, Al-Qamishli: Nine YPG-fighters killed in recapture of Abu Qasayib, 31. Dezember 2014: www.kurdwatch.org/index.php?aid=3314&z=en&cure=1016.

Kämpfe zwischen YPG, National Defense Forces, Regime, IS in und um Qamishli:

UN Human Rights Council, 13. August 2014:

«Renewed violence has been reported in Ayn al-Arab (Aleppo) as ISIS launched an offensive using advanced weapons seized in Iraq. **Sporadic clashes between YPG and local National Defence Forces were reported in the cities of Qamishli and Al Hasakah.**» Quelle: UN Human Rights Council, Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 13. August 2014: www.refworld.org/docid/53fed8134.html.

Understanding War, 9. August 2014:

«The **military arm of the de-facto independent Kurdish PYD party, the YPG, is in control of much of the province's countryside and capitalizes on local support from Christian and Arab tribal elements to defend against ISIS incursions.** The Kurdish Asayish security forces in charge of maintaining control inside city centers also coordinate locally with the regime's NDF militias, which include units of Arab tribesmen from the al-Sharabiyin and al-Tay tribes in addition to elements of Christian militias. **At the time of the fall of Mosul, the Syrian regime maintained control of the Qamishli airport and three hardened military bases throughout the province in addition to maintaining internal control within the major cities of Hasaka and Qamishli.** The provincial capital of Hasaka City has remained under joint control between Syrian regime and Kurdish forces, each of which maintain control over different neighborhoods with coordination to ensure service provision and quality of life within the city.

Rather than targeting these regime enclaves, **ISIS operations within the province throughout June and early July were largely directed against YPG forces in the countryside surrounding the cities of Ras al-Ayn and Qamishli on the Turkish border.** In these zones, small units of ISIS fighters operating in strategically located villages regularly contested terrain held by Kurdish YPG forces in the countryside and maintained limited pressure on regime and YPG resupply lines to Hasaka city. **ISIS forces also leveraged support from local Arab tribal elements, including the Sharabia tribe, a local rival to the YPG-allied Shaamar tribe.** The most significant ISIS stronghold in the province's northern countryside is located at **Tel Hamis deep within the countryside northeast of Hasaka City, which ISIS assumed firm control after successfully repulsing an attempt by the YPG to seize the village in early January 2014.** South of the city, it is assessed that the ISIS stronghold at ash-Shaddadi continues to serve as a command headquarters for ISIS forces throughout eastern Syria in addition to facilitating cross-border lines of communication and transit into Iraq's Ninewa province.

This ISIS activity in the Hasaka countryside focused on maintaining lines of communication that traverse the province in addition to creating sufficient operating room for ISIS forces to mobilize on other fronts. However, ISIS forces also conducted initial shaping operations to isolate Hasaka city from its flow of supplies from Qamishli to the north. ISIS targeted the areas surrounding Qamishli Airport with Grad rockets and conducted kidnappings of several bus passengers on the Hasaka-Qamishli road in late June. ISIS forces also continued to contest the towns of Tal Ma'arof, Kharab al-A'skar, and Tel Alo in the YPG-controlled countryside south of Qamishli throughout July. Interdicting a second major supply line to Hasaka City, ISIS has pressured YPG forces along the Ras al-Ayn – Hasaka road, targeting YPG forces in the vicinity of Tel Tamir, a town strategically located at the junction of two of the province's major highways. An IED detonated in a car along the road between Hasaka City and Tel Tamir on July 3, killing a PYD council member and a member of the town's Popular Council. In addition, an ISIS SVBIED reportedly disguised as a truck bringing supplies to the area targeted a YPG camp just northwest of Tel Tamir on the road to Ras al-Ayn on July 13, killing eight. While limited in scope, these attacks in the weeks prior to the attack on Sinjar demonstrate the ability of ISIS to penetrate deep into YPG-controlled territory in zones likely marked for future incorporation into the Islamic State.» Quelle: Understanding War, ISIS Works to Merge its Northern Front across Iraq and Syria, 9. August 2014:

www.understandingwar.org/article/isis-works-merge-its-northern-front-across-iraq-and-syria#sthash.0qYKauLu.dpuf.

Kurdwatch, 10. Dezember 2014:

«At the end of November, **the Syrian regime began forming new Arab militias. They are to cooperate with both the Democratic Union Party's (PYD) People's Defense Units (YPG) and the National Defense Forces.** The National Defense Forces are also regime-affiliated militias comprised of Arab tribe members. Some of the new militias are to be trained in Lebanon with Hezbollah fighters. In early November the Syrian president Bashar al-Assad received Arab tribal leaders and representatives of Christian groups from al-Hasakah province in Damascus. They demanded to form their own militias in order to stem the PYD's power in the Kurdish regions. According to

KurdWatch information, the president indicated that the supremacy of the PYD was not up for discussion. At the same time, however, he reportedly approved the formation of new military forces as long as these forces also cooperate with the PYD. » Quelle: Kurdwatch, Al-Qamishli: Syrian regime forms new militias, 10. Dezember 2014: www.kurdwatch.org/index.php?aid=3291&z=en&cure=1016.

Situationsanalyse des UNHCR im Oktober 2014:

«Nearly all parts of the country are now embroiled in violence, which is playing out between different actors in partially overlapping conflicts and is exacerbated by the participation of foreign fighters on all sides. Fighting between the Syrian government forces and an array of anti-government armed groups continues unabated. In parallel, the group “Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham” (hereafter ISIS) has consolidated control over significant areas in northern and north-eastern Syria and engages in frequent armed confrontations with anti-government armed groups, Kurdish forces (People’s Protection Units, YPG) as well as government forces. The launch of airstrikes against ISIS targets as of 23 September 2014 has added an additional layer of complexity to the conflict. As international efforts to find a political solution to the Syria situation have so far not been successful, the conflict, continues to cause further civilian casualties, displacement and destruction of the country’s infrastructure.

At the time of writing, government forces control large parts of the country’s western and central areas (Lattakia, Tartous, Hama and Homs governorates), the capital Damascus and most of its environs and the southern governorate of Suweida, in addition to the road links between these areas. ISIS has, as of mid-2014, consolidated its hold over a largely contiguous stretch of territory in mainly northern and north-eastern Syria (as well as large areas in neighbouring Iraq), including the eastern Aleppo countryside, Raqqa, Deir Ez-Zour and southern Hassakeh governorates.» Quelle: UN High Commissioner for Refugees, International Protection Considerations with regard to people fleeing the Syrian Arab Republic, Update III, Oktober 2014: www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1930_1414506190_544e446d4.pdf

3 Humanitäre Situation

Dramatische Verschlechterung der humanitären Situation in al-Hasaka. In der Provinz al-Hasaka verschlechterte sich in Folge der Eroberung angrenzender Gebiete durch die Terrororganisation IS die humanitäre Situation dramatisch. Bereits vorher litten die Menschen unter fehlender medizinischer Versorgung, massiven Preissteigerungen oder wegen fehlendem Benzin (*Syria Deeply*, 16. Januar 2013). Viele fliehen innerhalb der Provinz. Aufgrund der sich verschlechternden humanitären Lage werden Hilfsgüter dringend benötigt. UNHCR, WFP, WHO und UNICEF liefern Hilfsgüter in die Provinz (*UN Security Council*, 24. September 2014). Die Hilfsgüter können nicht über die Strassen transportiert werden, sondern müssen eingeflogen werden. Es gibt Hinweise, dass die PYD Hilfsgüter nur an ihre Gefolgsleute verteilt (*UN Human Rights Council*, 13. August 2014).

Syria Deeply, 16. Januar 2013:

«There is a general shortage of medication here. Periodically, the factories simply stop producing. They re-start only to stop again. For example, production at the Medicotics factory has been frozen for almost seven months. There are currently about five large factories that have stopped producing. Of course there are sometimes alternatives from other factories, but if people are used to medicine from a certain factory, they may not be persuaded by the alternative because they cannot trust it. So, they search all the pharmacies in the town for a specific brand that is unavailable. For some other kinds of medicine, such as insulin, we do not even have access to alternative brands.

SD: *What is the economic situation like more generally?*

Some essentials, such as baby food, are completely absent. The price of milk has increased a lot. For example, before the revolution NAN milk [a well-known brand] was at 175 lira. Now, it costs 380 lira. Some workers earn as little as 200 lira a day. So imagine how they are supposed to provide milk for their children. Fuel is also a great problem. Petrol is not sold in the stations. It is being stolen. In the stations it should cost 50 lira per liter. Once I filled my car with 750 lira worth of petrol but it was all fake and diluted. The needle on the meter didn't even move from its position, still showing an empty tank. In the streets, people put it in one and two-liter coke bottles. They sell one liter for 150 lira and more than half of it is fake. At the moment, there is little mazot [diesel]. It is administered by the [PKK-Associated] Democratic Union Party [PYD]. Previously, people were queuing for a trickle from the gas stations. Now, even this is not available.» Quelle: Syria Deeply, Conversations: A Pharmacist in Qamishli, 16. Januar 2013:

www.syriadeeply.org/articles/2013/01/2242/conversations-pharmacist-qamishli/.

UN Security Council, 24. September 2014:

«In Hasakeh, between 20,000 and 30,000 people were displaced as a result of the ongoing fighting in and around the Ya'robiyah, Jasaa and Gweiran neighbourhoods of Hasakeh city. The displaced have fled to other parts of Hasakeh, as well as to Qamishli. In addition, reports indicate that some 9,000 people fled four villages in Tal Hamis towards Qamishli and other locations following fighting between the People's Protection Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel) and other armed groups.

In the light of the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Hasakeh governorate, relief items continue to be urgently needed. The items are transported through the Nusaybin/Qamishli border crossing, which is the most direct and least costly route into the governorate. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs assured the United Nations on 17 September that the Nusaybin/Qamishli border crossing was open. The United Nations is negotiating with the authorities on further convoys. During the reporting period, UNHCR and WFP continued to organize airlifts from Damascus into Hasakeh governorate. WFP transported assistance for up to 63,000 people in August; UNHCR transported non-food items for up to 15,000 people. In addition, WHO was also able to deliver diarrhoea kits for more than 1,400 people and UNICEF airlifted supplies for more than 4,000 people in Qamishli.» Quelle: UN Security Council, Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014) and 2165 (2014); Report of the Secretary-General [S/2014/696], 24. September 2014:

www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1412156305_n1454423syr.pdf.

UN Human Rights Council, 13. August 2014:

«Accounts from March describe how YPG distributed humanitarian aid in Qamishli (Al-Hasakah) exclusively to their supporters. (...) Quelle: UN Human Rights Council, Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 13. August 2014: www.refworld.org/docid/53fed8134.html.