

## **Schnellrecherche der SFH-Länderanalyse vom 22. Januar 2016 zu Iran: Gefährdung eines Mitglieds der KDP bei der Rückkehr in den Iran**

Fragen an die SFH-Länderanalyse:

- Sind im Nordirak aktive Mitglieder der KDP bei der Rückkehr in den Iran gefährdet?
- Wie ist die Gefährdungslage eines in Nordirak in Kampfhandlungen involvierten Peshmerga-Kämpfers bei einer Rückkehr in den Iran zu beurteilen?
- Gibt es Informationen zu Jalil Gadani?

Die Informationen beruhen auf einer zeitlich begrenzten Recherche (Schnellrecherche) in öffentlich zugänglichen Dokumenten, die uns derzeit zur Verfügung stehen sowie auf den Informationen einer sachkundigen Kontaktperson.

### **1 Gefährdung eines Mitglieds und Peshmerga-Kämpfers der KDP-I, respektive der KDPI bei der Rückkehr in den Iran**

**Aufspaltung der *Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI)* in KDPI und KDP-I.** Die *Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran* KDPI wurde im Jahr 1945 in der Stadt Mahabad im Nordwesten des Iran gegründet. Nach Angaben verschiedener Quellen (*Cetti-Roberts*, 2015; *Bundesministerium für Inneres (BMI)*, 2015; *Al Jazeera* 2013; *Gunter* 2010) spaltete sich die KDPI im Jahr 2006 oder 2007 in die zwei Parteien KDPI (auch PDKI genannt) und KDP-I auf. Laut *Gunter* sollen die meisten Anführer der KDPI in die KDP-I gewechselt haben. Da die KDPI in Iran verboten sei, liegt ihr Hauptquartier laut BMI (2015) in Irak. Nach Angaben des Journalisten *Cetti-Roberts*, der am 24. September 2015 von den Aktivitäten der KDP-I in Irak berichtete, befindet sich das Hauptquartier der KDP-I in der Stadt Koya in der autonomen Region Kurdistan (KRG) in Nordirak. Laut eines Artikels von *Al Jazeera* (2013) sei die KDPI (PDKI) die grössere Gruppierung und werde von Mustafa Hejri angeführt. Sie sei in drei Lagern in Nordirak beheimatet und verfügte 2013 nach eigenen Angaben über rund 800 Peshmerga-Kämpfer. Das *UK Home Office* dagegen nennt in seinem Bericht vom August 2015 sowohl KDPI und KDP-I als Namen für die *Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran*.

**Mitgliedschaft in der KDP-I und Tätigkeit als Peshmerga-Kämpfer.** Nach Angaben von Mustafa Moloudi von der KDP-I in Nordirak gegenüber dem *Danish Immigration Service* (DIS 2013) gebe es zwei Arten von Mitgliedschaft bei der KDP-I: Ordentliche Mitglieder und professionelle Vollzeitmitglieder. Eine Person, welche ein ordentliches Parteimitglied werden wolle, müsse ein zweimonatiges Training in Nordirak durchlaufen. Während dieser Zeit würde die Person über das Parteiprogramm instruiert und erhalte eine militärische Ausbildung. Die meisten hochrangigen professionellen Mitglieder lebten im Hauptquartier im Lager nahe der Stadt Khoysanjaq (auch Koya genannt) in den kurdischen Gebieten in Irak. Ein ordentliches Mitglied könne nach einigen (zum Beispiel drei) Jahren Tätigkeit als Peshmerga und ordentliches Mitglied ein professionelles Mitglied werden. Dafür würde sie einem Training (*Basic*

Weyermannsstrasse 10  
Postfach 8154  
CH-3001 Bern

T++41 31 370 75 75  
F++41 31 370 75 00

info@fluechtlingshilfe.ch  
www.fluechtlingshilfe.ch

Spendenkonto  
PC 30-1085-7



*Political-Organizational Course*) mit einer Dauer von 45 Tagen bis zwei Monaten unterzogen. Nachdem die Person das Training absolviert und ein Zertifikat erhalten habe, und wenn sie während eines Jahres Vollzeit für die Partei arbeite, könne die Person zu einem *Fourth Grade Cadre* befördert werden. Es bestehe die Möglichkeit, nach längerer Tätigkeit und mit weiteren Schulungen graduell weiter in der Partei aufzusteigen. Die höchste Stufe der Parteimitgliedschaft sei *First Grade Cadre*. Um ein professionelles Mitglied der KDP-I zu werden, muss eine Person laut derselben Quelle zunächst Peschmerga werden.

**Wiederaufnahme militärischer Aktivitäten der KDP-I gegen Iran sowie Wahrnehmung der KDP-I und anderer Gruppierungen durch iranische Behörden als Bedrohung.** In einem Artikel von *Al Jazeera* vom 12. September 2015 wird berichtet, dass die KDP-I nach 20 Jahren den bewaffneten Kampf wieder aufgenommen habe. Nach Angaben von Khalid Wanaswasha, des Kommandanten des bewaffneten Flügels der KDP-I, stünden mehrere 1000 Männer und Frauen unter seinem Kommando und würden auch auf dem iranischen Staatsgebiet aktiv sein. Zwar würde die KDP-I nicht Krieg mit Iran suchen, jedoch hätten die iranischen Streitkräfte in den letzten drei Monaten ihre vor Ort stationierten militärischen Kräfte massiv aufgestockt. Peschmerga-Kämpfer der Gruppierung KDPI wiederum seien auch offensiv gegen iranische Truppen vorgegangen und in verschiedene Kämpfe mit iranischen Truppen verwickelt gewesen. Auch der Journalist *Cetti-Roberts* berichtet in seinem Artikel vom September 2015, dass die Mobilisierung der KDP-I und anderer Gruppierungen die iranischen Behörden provoziert habe. So habe Iran zwei Monate zuvor nur wenige Truppen an der Grenze zur KRG-Region stationiert gehabt. Vor kurzem habe laut des Artikels Ali Shamkhani, der Sekretär des iranischen *Supreme National Security Council* die Aktivitäten der KDP-I angeprangert und gesagt, dass ein Krieg mit Iran provoziert werde. Seither habe Iran eine grosse Zahl von Truppen, inklusive 100 Panzern, Raketensystemen und andere schwere Waffensysteme in der Nähe der Grenze stationiert. Verschiedene Quellen, die im DIS-Bericht (2013) zitiert werden, berichten ebenfalls, dass iranische Behörden Personen mit Verbindungen zur KDPI und anderen kurdischen Gruppierungen als Bedrohung wahrnehmen.

**Teilnahme der Kämpfer der KDP-I an Kampfhandlungen gegen die Terrormiliz Islamischer Staat.** Gemäss des Artikels des kurdischen Mediennetzwerks *Rudaw* vom 8. Dezember 2014 haben drei iranische kurdische Parteien, darunter die KDP-I, die Peschmerga-Streitkräfte der KRG-Region mit eigenen Kämpfern bei Kampfhandlungen in Gwer und Makhmour gegen die Terrororganisation Islamischer Staat unterstützt. Nach Angaben der KDP-I seien rund 250 Kämpfer entsandt worden, um an der Seite der Streitkräfte der KRG zu kämpfen. Anfang Dezember 2014 habe die KDP-I zudem eine Gruppe von Kämpfern in die Region Khazer westlich von Erbil geschickt. Laut *Rudaw* seien die Kämpfer der KDP-I nur zwei Tage in Gwer und Makhmour gewesen und dann wieder in ihrer Stützpunkte zurückgezogen worden. Der Einsatz und der Abzug der Kämpfer seien auf Bitte eines Ministeriums der KRG-Region erfolgt und die Kämpfer seien während ihres Einsatzes unter dem Kommando der Peschmerga-Streitkräfte gestanden.

**Brutale Unterdrückung kurdischer Oppositionsgruppen und Verbot der KDPI in Iran.** Nach Angaben des Berichts des *UK Home Office* vom August 2015 werden kurdische Oppositionsgruppen, welche separatistischer Aspirationen verdächtigt werden,

in Iran brutal unterdrückt. Dazu gehören beispielsweise auch die KDPI. Nach Angaben verschiedener Quellen sind die KDPI und weitere kurdische Gruppierungen in Iran verboten und können dort nicht legal tätig sein (BMI 2015, AI 2012).

**Willkürliche Verhaftung und unfaire Gerichtsverfahren.** Laut dem *US Department of State* (USDOS 2015) setzen iranische Behörden Sicherheitsgesetze und weitere Rechtsvorschriften ein, um kurdische Personen zu verhaften und zu verfolgen. Nach Angaben des *Iran Human Rights Documentation Center* (IHRDC 2012) werden Kurdinnen und Kurden oft unter einem falschen Vorwand verhaftet. Dazu gehörte die Beschuldigung der Spionage, des Waffenbesitzes oder Drogenhandels. Bei einer Verhaftung seien kurdische Personen dem gleichen Muster von Misshandlung und unfairen Gerichtsverfahren ausgesetzt wie politische Häftlinge. *Amnesty International* (AI 2012) berichtet ebenfalls von unfairen Gerichtsverfahren und willkürlicher Verhaftung.

**Massive Konsequenzen für Aktivitäten im Zusammenhang mit KDP-I, KDPI oder weiteren kurdischen politischen Parteien.** Nach Angaben einer E-Mail-Auskunft vom 15. Januar 2016 von einer iranischen Kontaktperson<sup>1</sup> suchen die iranischen Behörden laufend nach Mitgliedern der KPD, KPD-I oder KDPI. Wenn eine solche Person verhaftet werde, werde sie praktisch immer strafrechtlich verfolgt und zu einer schweren Strafe verurteilt. Dabei liegt die Bandbreite laut aktuellen Angaben der Kontaktperson zwischen mehrjährigen Gefängnisstrafen bis zur Todesstrafe. In den kurdischen Gebieten in Iran würden die iranischen Behörden oft Medienschaffende und zivilgesellschaftliche Aktivistinnen und Aktivisten der Mitgliedschaft in der KDPI, KDP oder KDP-I beschuldigen. Diese würden zu schweren Strafen verurteilt, auch wenn sie in der Realität gar keine Verbindung zu einer der Gruppierungen bzw. eine gemeinsame Aktivität mit der KDPI, der KDP oder KDP-I aufweisen.

Laut den Angaben eines westlichen Diplomaten und Iran-Experten in Erbil im Bericht des *Danish Immigration Service* (DIS) aus dem Jahr 2013 toleriert das iranische Regime keinerlei Aktivitäten in Zusammenhang mit kurdischen politischen Parteien. Jegliche Verbindung mit einer dieser Parteien könne ein Grund für eine Verhaftung sein. Die gleiche Quelle wies auch darauf hin, dass die Zahl der Hinrichtungen kurdischer Personen in Iran hoch sei. Oft würden Todesstrafen aufgrund von Drogenhandel verhängt, wobei auch politische Aktivisten fälschlich des Drogenhandels beschuldigt und hingerichtet werden.

Eine weitere Kontaktperson des *Norwegian People's Aid* in Irak bestätigte gegenüber DIS (2013), dass die Beschuldigung des Drogenhandels oft von iranischen Behörden gegen Personen vorgebracht werde, die politischer Aktivitäten verdächtigt werden und gegen die keine Beweise vorlägen. Laut den Angaben gegenüber DIS (2013) durch den Analysten Ziryan Roj Helaty vom *Tanupo Magazine* könne irgendetwas, das mit der KDPI zu tun habe, eine Person in Iran in Schwierigkeiten bringen. Jemand, der über die KDPI spreche, werde in den Augen des Regimes mit der KDPI eine Verbindung auf und werde als Bedrohung wahrgenommen. Laut Angaben von UNHCR in Erbil gegenüber DIS im Jahr 2013 werden Mitglieder der KDPI in der Regel zu ungefähr zwei bis zehn Jahren Gefängnis verurteilt, wenn sie von den iranischen Behörden verhaftet werden. Die iranischen Behörden foltern nach Informationen des UNHCR

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<sup>1</sup> Die iranische Kontaktperson ist in den Bereichen Menschenrechten und Journalismus tätig.

Erbil verhaftete KDPI-Mitglieder in der Untersuchungshaft, um Geständnisse und Namen anderer KDPI-Mitglieder zu erfahren. Diese Untersuchungshaft dauere in der Regel zwischen einem bis sechs Monate. Nach Angaben von Mustafa Moloudi von der KDP-I gegenüber DIS (2013) wurden einige KDP-I-Parteimitglieder in Iran verhaftet. Einige seien hingerichtet worden, andere seien nach ihrer Haft entlassen worden.

Nach Angaben des UNHCR Erbil gegenüber DIS (2013) hat auch eine Person, welche aktiv die KDPI unterstützt und ihr hilft, mit ernsthaften Konsequenzen zu rechnen, wenn sie von den iranischen Behörden verhaftet wird. Auch Unterstützende der KDPI mit einem niedrigen Profil würden in Haft gesetzt und teilweise gefoltert. Nach gegenüber dem DIS (2013) gemachten Angaben von Mohamed Sahebi von der KDPI können die Konsequenzen sowohl für blosse Sympathisanten als auch für Mitglieder der Partei Gefängnis und Folter sein.

Viele Gefängnisse in den kurdischen Gebieten in Iran seien geheim und humanitäre Organisationen hätten keinen Zugang und keine Möglichkeit, diese zu überprüfen. Nach Angaben von *Human Rights Watch* (HRW 2014) befanden sich 2014 Dutzende von Mitgliedern kurdischer Oppositionsgruppen wie der KDPI in der Stadt Karaj in der Provinz Alborz in Haft. Viele seien wegen terroristischer Aktivitäten verurteilt worden und würden lange Gefängnisstrafen verbüssen. Auch seien einige zum Tode verurteilt worden. Nach Angaben der Webseite der KDP-I (2015) wurde als jüngstes Beispiel am 14. Juni 2015 der KDP-I-Aktivist Mansour Arwand in Iran hingerichtet.

**Hinrichtungen und Todesstrafen für kurdische Personen.** Laut des Berichts des *UN Human Rights Council* vom 20. Februar 2015 wurden im Jahr 2014 mindestens 33 Kurdinnen und Kurden für Verstöße gegen die nationale Sicherheit zum Tode verurteilt. Nach Angaben von *Al Jazeera* (2015) seien im Jahr 2015 bis September in Iran rund 17 politische Häftlinge kurdischer Ethnie exekutiert worden.

**2015 höchste Zahl von Exekutionen in Iran seit 25 Jahren.** Nach Angaben des Berichts des *UN General Assembly* vom Oktober 2015 habe die Zahl der Exekutionen in Iran seit 2005 exponentiell zugenommen. Im Jahr 2015 werde laut Schätzungen die höchste Zahl von Exekutionen in Iran seit 25 Jahren erreicht worden sein. Bis September waren im Jahr 2015 694 Personen exekutiert worden.

**Starke Präsenz des iranischen Geheimdienstes in den kurdischen Gebieten in Irak.** Nach Angaben einer E-Mail-Auskunft einer iranischen Kontaktperson vom 15. Januar 2016 sind die iranischen Behörden sehr aktiv in Irak und würden gute Beziehungen zur irakischen Zentralregierung pflegen. Zudem hätten sie ebenfalls gute Beziehungen zur Regierung der KRG-Region in Irak. Nach Einschätzung der Kontaktperson sei es gut möglich, dass die Sicherheitsbehörden des Iran und der KRG-Region kooperieren. Laut der E-Mail-Auskunft der Kontaktperson hätten verschiedene im Jahr 2010 via dem Irak ins Ausland geflohene iranische Journalisten angegeben, dass der iranische Geheimdienst in den kurdischen Gebieten in Irak tätig sei. Auch ein Bericht von *Al-Monitor* vom 14. Januar 2014 weist darauf hin, dass Iran viele Geheimdienstmitarbeitende in der KRG-Region einsetzt. Auch übe Iran Einfluss auf politische Führer von Parteien in der KRG und sogar auf die Bildung der Regierung aus. Die KDP-I und die KDPI würden von der Regierung der KRG geduldet, solange sie nicht gegen Iran kämpften.

Der Journalist *Cetti-Roberts* (2015) weist ebenfalls darauf hin, dass iranische Spione für die KDP-I ein Problem darstellen. So durchlaufen neue Mitglieder zunächst eine Probezeit, während der sie unter Beobachtung stehen, um ausschliessen zu können, dass sie iranische Spione seien. Erst nach längerer Zeit würden sie für Aktivitäten in der Nähe oder gar in Iran eingesetzt. Der Bericht des *Danish Immigration Service* (DIS, 2013) zitiert verschiedene Quellen, welche bestätigen, dass der iranische Geheimdienst in den kurdischen Gebieten in Irak präsent ist und sehr gute Beziehungen mit den irakischen kurdischen Parteien unterhalte. Iranische Staatsbürger in der kurdischen Region in Irak werden laut zwei vom DIS interviewten Journalisten des *Awene Newspaper* überwacht. Einige hätten Drohungen via SMS erhalten und andere seien bespitzelt worden. Die beiden Journalisten wiesen ebenfalls auf die starke Präsenz des iranischen Geheimdienstes hin. Viele Iranerinnen und Iraner in der kurdischen Region in Irak hätten Drohungen erhalten oder ihre Telefone seien überwacht worden. Nach Angaben von Mustafa Moloudi von der KDP-I gegenüber DIS (2013) hätten iranische Behörden Kenntnis von einigen KDP-I-Mitgliedern, welche im Hauptquartier im Lager nahe von Khoysanjaq in Nordirak lebten. Von verschiedenen dieser Personen sei den iranischen Behörden deren Namen und Heimatstadt in Iran bekannt.

**Aktivitäten für KDP-I und andere kurdische Gruppierungen in Irak können Rückkehrende gefährden.** Nach Angaben verschiedener Quellen des Berichts von DIS 2013 berücksichtigen iranische Behörden bei der Überprüfung Rückkehrender, ob eine Person in einem Flüchtlingslager in Irak gelebt hatte. Alle Flüchtlingslager hätten Verbindungen zu politischen Parteien und Personen aus diesen Lagern seien deswegen für die Behörden verdächtig. Personen, welche solche politische Verbindungen aufweisen, werden bei einer Rückkehr in den Iran Probleme erhalten. So sei beispielsweise eine rückkehrende Person, die angeblich mit einer Oppositionspartei Verbindungen aufwies, zu drei Jahren Haft verurteilt worden. Auch nach der Haftentlassung sei die Person weiterhin im Fokus der Behörden gestanden. Nach Angaben einer weiteren Quelle werden rückkehrende Personen, welche lange in den KRG-Gebieten gelebt haben, von den iranischen Behörden einer genauen Überprüfung unterzogen, um ihre dortigen Aktivitäten herauszufinden. Wenn eine Person in Kontakt mit der KDPI oder anderen kurdischen politischen Parteien war, sei davon auszugehen, dass sie in Schwierigkeiten gerate.

Al Jazeera, 2013:

*«The PDKI split in 2006, while five groups claim the name Komala. Today, the larger PDKI faction, headed by Mustafa Hejri, is based in three desolate camps in northern Iraq. Hejri claims the party has 800 peshmerga - Kurdish guerrillas - but the mostly aging, pot-bellied men would be no match for Iran's Revolutionary Guards.»*  
Quelle: Al Jazeera, Iran awaits 'Kurdish Spring', 29. Juni 2013:  
[www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/06/2013627152045730568.html](http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/06/2013627152045730568.html).

BMI, 2015:

*«In 2006 the KDPI split up again and both parties insist that they represent the former KDPI and use the name for their newly-created party.<sup>54</sup> According to the self-description on the official Website of the party 'the PDKI [KDPI] is a democratic socialist party and (...) a member of the Socialist International (SI). For us, democratic*

socialism entails the belief that all human beings, whether as individuals or as members of nations, should be free and equal in all spheres of life. The PDKI's policies on economic, political and social issues are based on these beliefs.<sup>55</sup> The highest decision making body of the KDPI party structures is the Central Committee. It is elected at the congress – which is held every four years – and consists of 25 permanent members and 10 substitute members. By now, the KDPI had held 15 congresses. Seven members of the Central Committee are elected to the Political Bureau, including the Secretary General. The chairpersons of the Democratic Women's Union of Iranian Kurdistan, the Democratic Youth Union of Kurdistan and the Democratic Students Union of Kurdistan are automatically members of the Central Committee.<sup>56</sup>

Conclusively, **the KDPI is banned in Iran and thus not able to operate there**; its headquarters are located in the KRG area and therefore, no attacks are undertaken by the KDPI in Iran. The disunity and discord within the party remains leading to a loss of influence within the Kurdish population.»

Quelle: BMI – Bundesministerium für Inneres (Taucher, Wolfgang; Vogl, Mathias; Webinger, Peter [eds.]): regiones et res publicae – The Kurds: History – Religion – Language – Politics, 2015, S. 170:

[www.ecoi.net/file\\_upload/90\\_1447760239\\_bfa-regiones-et-res-publicae-the-kurds-2015.pdf](http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/90_1447760239_bfa-regiones-et-res-publicae-the-kurds-2015.pdf).

Gunter, 2010:

«**Jalil Ghadani led a faction called KDPI-Revolutionary Leadership** which accused Ghassemloo of abandoning socialism and using undemocratic methods. Iranian agents assassinated Ghassemloo in August 1989 and his successor Sadiq Sharafkindi three years later. Mustafa Hijri became the new leader of the KDPI, **but by 2007 the party had split into the KDPI and the KDP-I** (the precise meaning of the hyphen in the second term is not clear). **Most of the main KDPI leaders, including Abdullah Hanzadeh (who some sources claim had actually been the party's leader from 1993 to 2005), left the KDPI and began to build up the KDP-I.**»

Quelle: Michael M. Gunter, Historical Dictionary of the Kurds, 2010, S. 175-176.

Matt Cetti-Roberts, 2015:

«The history of the KDP-I is, as typical here, complicated. The original KDP-I group formed as a democratic socialist and Kurdish nationalist party in 1945 in Mahabad, the capital of Iranian Kurdistan. The party predates the Iraqi Kurdish party, the KDP, by one year. Although their politics are similar, the KDP-I differs from its Iraqi counterpart in that tribal links are not part of party politics. The KDP-I set out to improve Kurdish rights in Iran and fought with Iranian forces for many years, even before the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Like all of Kurdistan, which is split between Syria, Turkey, Iraq and Iran, the Kurds have lived under the yoke of nations which divide their homeland. These countries have human rights records which are not the most impeccable – and that's definitely the case in Iranian Kurdistan, also known as Rojhelat by the Kurds. A renewed insurgency took place in 1989 as a reaction to the assassination in Vienna of the KDP-I's then leader, Abdul Rahman Ghassmlou, by suspected Iranian agents. A bloody fight between the KDP-I and the Iranian regime followed, involving deaths both inside Iran and other countries. In July 1996, Iranian troops entered Iraqi Kurdistan, where the group had its base, displacing thousands of refugees and killing around 20

KDP-I members. On Aug. 4, 1996, the KDP-I announced it would cease cross-border raids in an effort to stop further incursions into Iraqi Kurdistan. **In the mid-2000s, the party split into two factions due to differences in strategy. Now there's the KDPI (also known as PDKI) and ... the KDP-I.** Similar names for political groups are the norm over here. If that sounds strange, there are three different groups each named Komala also fighting Iran, all with slightly differing politics or strategies. The root cause is that human rights abuses within Iran and Iranian Kurdistan are not showing any sign of stopping. The United Nations Human Rights Council reported that there were 753 executions in Iran in 2014, the majority of which were for crimes that do not meet international criteria for being 'most serious' in nature. The KDP-I do not seek to split Rojhelat from Iran, just to give the Kurds there more rights and a fair chance. In 2015, Iran is on track to surpass that amount having already carried out 694 executions between the start of 2015 and July 15 despite having elected moderate Hassan Rouhani as president in 2013. The journey from the peshmerga's main headquarters – an ex-Iraqi army fortress in Koya, some 50 kilometers to the west of Erbil — to the city of Choman is a long one. A few hours in, many of the travelers begin to snooze, their heads bobbing in motion to the movements of the vehicle. Kalashnikov rifles rest on any flat surface without baggage or sit propped between the knees of semi-conscious fighters. (...) nFighters rotate through various outposts, often spending up to 40 days in the mountains before heading back to the headquarters in Koya. To join the KDP-I, you must be at least 18 years old, and most of the new peshmerga first arrive at this camp. With new – and often very young — peshmerga coming in from Iranian Kurdistan, **the KDP-I puts the new fighters through a probationary period to weed out Iranian spies. Even though the older generation may personally know some of the young fighters' families, they still watch them. Once the new recruits prove themselves, the fighters slowly rotate forward to positions closer to Iran. The most experienced and trusted peshmerga will cross the frontier, to operate inside the borders of their homeland.** (...) Although the KDP-I have returned to the area, and have sent fighters into Iran, the group is not seeking to directly engage with the Iranian forces, for now at least. **However, it did skirmish in September with a pro-government militia in the Kurdish-Iranian town of Shino.** 'We do everything we can to avoid physical contact with the regime,' Khalid says. 'We do not get in conflict with them. The main objective is to be in our country to meet our people, to meet our agents, to meet our political partners, to spread our political ideologies so people can know what it is we are fighting for.' Some of the other Iranian-Kurdish parties have declared war on the regime, including the PDKI, but beyond the recent firefight the most Khalid's group has done for now is move weapons across the border. 'This is where our people are, where our families are,' Khalid adds. Contrary to what one would expect, the group's goals are not to separate Rojhelat from Iran, but to gain more freedom for the Kurds – a different outlook than factions in Iraqi Kurdistan, where most people support and talk openly of independence from Baghdad. **The mobilization of the KDP-I and other groups have nonetheless provoked Tehran to react. Two months ago, the Iranian military had few troops opposite the border facing Iraqi Kurdistan. Recently, Rear Adm. Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, appeared on Iranian television to denounce the work of the KDP-I, stating that it was provoking war with Iran. Since then, Iran has moved large amounts of troops, including 100 tanks, Katyusha rocket systems and other heavy weapons closer to the border in an attempt to stop any incursions.** 'We know our presence is provoking a lot of reactions,' Khalid admits.

Even on the Iraqi side of the border there have been problems. 'The PKK have had some issues with the PDKI, which is the group that we split from some years ago,' Khalid says. In May 2015, the PKK clashed with PDKI forces after the latter established bases in the border regions of the Khandil Mountains – an area that the PKK has held since the anti-Iranian rebels left the area years ago. Local media reported that two Iranian-Kurdish fighters died in the fight. Khalid says the KDP-I has avoided conflict with the PKK, though both groups are near each other. There are only a few PKK fighters in this immediate area, though Turkish air strikes are visible from the KDP-I's positions.» Quelle: Matt Cetti-Roberts, Into the Mountains with Kurdish Rebels Fighting Iran, The KDP-I Builds Up its Forces After Being Gone for nearly two Decades, In: War Is Boring, 24. September 2015: [www.warisboring.com/articles/into-the-mountains-with-kurdish-rebels-fighting-iran/](http://www.warisboring.com/articles/into-the-mountains-with-kurdish-rebels-fighting-iran/).

Al-Monitor, 2014:

«The main Kurdish parties in Iran, the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) and the Marxist group Komala, fragmented into several factions after losing the war against the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in the 1990s, moving into exile in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. **According to the BBC Persian journalist Jiyar Gol, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) allows these Kurdish parties to stay if they do not attack Iran. Ammar Goli, a Kurdish journalist based in Iraqi Kurdistan, says the Kurdish parties made an agreement with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in 1996 to maintain bases and camps inside Iraqi Kurdistan: 'If they fight against the Iranian government, they do not get economic support from the PUK.'** As a result, their activities are limited. This is also because of Iran's political influence in Kurdistan. While Turkey is making business and oil deals with the KRG, **Iran employs many intelligence agents in the KRG and even influences political party leadership and government formation in Iraqi Kurdistan during political crises in Kurdistan.** For instance, on Jan. 12, a high-level KRG delegation from KRG's two ruling parties, the PUK and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), visited Iran to negotiate over the formation of the Kurdish government, which has been in deadlock as a result of the weakening of the PUK and the rise of the Kurdish opposition party Change (Gorran).» Quelle: Al-Monitor, Iranian Kurdish parties prefer dialogue with government, 14. Januar 2014: <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/01/iranian-kurdish-parties-waning-support-exiles-pkk-turkey.html#>.

Rudaw, 2014:

«**Three Kurdish parties from Iran briefly had troops fighting alongside the Kurdistan Region's Peshmerga forces in battles in Gwer and Makhmour against the Islamic State (IS/ISIS), party officials said. The Kurdistan Democratic Party-Iran (KDP-I), Kurdistan Freedom Party and Kurdistan Struggle Agency, all based in the Kurdistan Region, had sent fighters into the battlefield, party officials said.** Two other parties, also with bases in Kurdistan, expressed readiness to join the fight. The tide in the battles for Gwer and Makhmour reportedly turned in favor of the Peshmerga after US jets began strikes against IS positions on Saturday, joined by the Iraqi air force. **The KDP-I said it had sent some 250 fighters to fight alongside the Kurdistan Regional Government's (KRG) forces. Early last week the KDP-I sent a group of fighters to the Khazer area in the west of Erbil. Sources said that the**

**KDP-I fighters had only remained in Gwer and Makhmour for two days and later withdrew to their bases. 'We joined the battlefield at the request of the KRG ministry of Peshmerga and the return to our bases was at the request of the same ministry as well,' (...), a member of the KDP-I leadership, told the Kurdpa agency. 'During that time our forces were under the command of the commander of Peshmerga forces,' he added. Jahangiri denied that KDP-I forces were withdrawn due to pressure from Iran.**

The Kurdistan Freedom Party was the first to offer support, last week sending a group of fighters near Mount Shingal, where Peshmerga forces were fighting to stop an IS advance toward tens of thousands of Kurdish Yazidis stuck on the arid mountain for a week. **'We are ready for all kinds of support to further stabilize and improve the Kurdistan Region,' the KDP-I said in a statement.** Halgurd Hikmat, spokesman for the Peshmerga ministry in Erbil, said that 'since the beginning of the IS attacks on the Kurdistan Region a large number of Kurdish activists and Peshmerga from East (Iranian) Kurdistan have contacted us and expressed their readiness to defend Kurdistan.' He said activists also had launched a campaign to collect aid for Kurds in Kobane in Syrian Kurdistan and in Shingal. The organizers of the campaign said that their effort was aimed at raising international awareness about the tragedies committed against the Kurdish people.» Quelle: Rudaw, Iranian Kurdish Parties Support Peshmerga With Fighters, 8. Dezember 2014: <http://rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/12082014>.

Al Jazeera, 2015:

«Khalid Wanawasha is the commander of the armed wing of the **Kurdistan Democratic Party Iran (KDP-I)**, a group that for 70 years has campaigned for autonomy for Iranian Kurds. Some of Wanawasha's fighters are nearly as old. It's a struggle with which few outsiders are familiar, but 52-year-old Wanawasha and many of his comrades have devoted most of their lives to the cause. **For the last 20 years, the KDP-I and other Kurdish groups outlawed in Iran, have pursued their goals politically from exile in Iraq.** They watched recently as Kurds in Turkey, Iraq, and Syria have attracted international attention, while their own struggle has stalled. **Convinced now that they will never achieve autonomy for Iranian Kurds without force, Iranian Kurdish fighters have once again taken up arms, returning to the mountains of the Iran-Iraq border. While the newly mobilised fighters are exuberantly confident, observers question whether, despite their grievances, significant numbers of Iranian Kurds will support armed insurrection.** Alex Vatanka, an Iran analyst at the Middle East Institute in Washington, DC, told Al Jazeera: 'I question very much how much support they will find for an armed struggle among the Kurdish people. They see what armed conflict in the Middle East looks like, why on earth would they want to invite that mayhem and destruction?'

Iran's Kurds have long struggled for greater autonomy. In 1946, they founded the short-lived Mahabad Republic, which foundered the next year after the Soviets withdrew support. It remains the only time Kurds have maintained an independent state. Kurds again demanded autonomy after the 1979 Iranian revolution, which led to armed conflict with the new Islamist government, and was followed by clashes that continued into the 1990s. The long-running revolt largely ended in 1996, when government offensives

and pressure on the autonomous Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq encouraged the Iranian Kurdish fighters to withdraw from bases along the Iraqi-Iranian border in the Qandil Mountains to settle in camps within Iraq's northern Kurdish region. The KDP-I and other Iranian Kurds then reached a tacit agreement with the KRG to continue their struggle politically and not carry out military attacks against Iran from Iraqi territory. **Back in the mountains after a two decade hiatus of military activity, Wanawasha said although some of the several thousand men and women under his command are now crossing into Iran, the KDP-I is not looking for a war. He conceded, though, that their presence could provoke one. 'The Iranians have shown up in massive force since we came here three months ago. They are definitely planning a reaction,' he said, adding that his forces would only act in self defence.**

**The KDP-I has a separate faction though, which is talking a tougher game. Loghman Ahmedi, an Iranian Kurd raised in Sweden, is head of foreign relations of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI). Ahmedi, who spends up to eight months a year travelling to promote his party's cause, explained that the original party - formed in Mahabad in 1945 - split in 2006 due to personality clashes. The PDKI was able to mobilise several thousand fighters, he said, some of whom were now operating in Iran under new rules of engagement. Previously, they were ordered to fire only in self-defence, but he said this has now changed: 'We have a clear decision by our party leadership that we will fight this regime by any means possible.' In recent weeks, local affiliates of these groups have reported carrying out sabotage attacks in Iran and engaging in firefights with the Iranian army. Lack of economic development in Kurdish areas and the Iranian government's allegedly repressive domestic policies are a major grievance for many of the country's estimated seven million Kurds, according to these leaders. So far in 2015, the Iranian government has executed 17 Kurdish political prisoners, the most recent on August 26 when Amnesty International reported the execution of 30-year-old Kurd Behrouz Alkhani - despite the fact that he was awaiting the outcome of a supreme court appeal. Such executions have convinced many that the government will never truly reconcile with Kurds, said Hajir Sharifi, an Iranian Kurdish human rights activist living in Iraq. 'Kurds in Iran simply lost their faith in Tehran's ability to make any positive changes in its policy towards them.' While Iran appears to have recently moved closer to Western countries by reaching a deal to limit its nuclear programme in return for sanctions relief, the Iranian Kurdish parties remain distrustful. Ahmedi says he sees signs that Kurds in Iran may be close to the boiling point. In May, predominantly Kurdish cities across Iran erupted in protest after a Kurdish woman in the city of Mahabad died after falling from a balcony, allegedly following a sexual assault by a member of the Iranian security services.» Quelle: Al Jazeera, Meet the Kurdish fighters mobilising against Tehran, 12. September 2015:  
[www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/09/meet-kurdish-fighters-mobilising-tehran-150903093406685.html](http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/09/meet-kurdish-fighters-mobilising-tehran-150903093406685.html).**

KDP-I, 2015:

**«Kurdish Political prisoner and KDP activist Mansour Arwand has been executed by the Islamic Republic of Iran (...) This Kurdish political prisoner was relocated from the prison of Urmia to the prison of Mahabad last year on November 29th 2014.**

*Mansour Arwend's punishment as political prisoner was downgraded at that moment from execution to sentence to life- On May 7th 2015, he was relocated again from the prison of Mahabad to the prison of Miyanduaw by Ministry of Intelligence agents. **Mansour Arwand was a patriotic and revolutionary Kurd that chose to join the ranks of the Kurdistan Democratic Party 10 years ago in his efforts to struggle for the Kurdish nation and started working for the KDPs underground organization team inside Eastern-Kurdistan.** It is also important to note that Mansour Arwand was involved in many patriotic activities and many efforts to support freedom of the Kurdish people even before he joined the KDP. He was a sportsman and was greatly respected by the Kurdish people, especially the youth, for his patriotic and pro democratic activities. (...) Mansour was brutally tortured and suffered enormously for over 1 year in the prison of Mahabad. All efforts of the government were centered around torturing Mansour Arwend to break his will to make false confessions, so that the government could execute him on false grounds. The so called 'Court' of the clerics of Islamic Republic in Mahabad, issued the death sentence for Mansour Arwand on 12th June 2012. The torturing and suffering of this political prisoner and the harassment and threats to his family continued, even after the rule of his death sentence was forced upon him unjustly. His was transferred from prison to prison and the government came with excuses after excuses every now and then but they did not manage to break his will and his dedication to his nation and the aims of his party. With the execution of Mansour Arwand, Kurdistan Democratic Party lost a precious member, an active, revolutionary and devoted member. This is why we send our deepest condolences to the spouse of Mansour Arwand and to all of his relatives, to all the people of Mahabad and all the activists who strive and struggle for freedom and democracy in Kurdistan. Mansour Arwand is the most recent martyr of our path to freedom for the Kurdish nation. Down with the brutal repressive criminal regime of the Islamic Republic. Kurdistan Democratic Party-organization commission (KDP-Iran)» Quelle: Kurdistan Democratic Party Iran, KDP Press, KDP-Organizing commission press releaseregarding the execution of Mansour Arwand, 14. Juni 2015:  
<http://archive.kurdistanukurd.com/en/balga/KDP-Organizing-commission-press-release-regarding-the.pdf>.*

UK Home Office, August 2015

**«Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI also known as PDKI, KDP-I and DPIK)**

*5.2.1 The KDPI was founded in the city of Mahabad in Iranian Kurdistan on August 16, 1945.<sup>24</sup> The KDPI was the largest and best organized of the Kurdish opposition groups, and sought autonomy for the Kurds in Iran. ... **Kurdish opposition groups suspected of separatist aspirations, such as the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI), are brutally suppressed.** At least 28 Kurdish prisoners convicted of national security charges remained on death row at the end of 2012.<sup>25</sup>»  
Quelle: UK Home Office: Country Information and Guidance; Iran: Kurds, August 2015, S. 16:*

[www.ecoi.net/file\\_upload/90\\_1440054850\\_ukhomeoffice201508-cig-iran-kurds.pdf](http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/90_1440054850_ukhomeoffice201508-cig-iran-kurds.pdf).

DIS, 2013 (Konsequenzen einer Tätigkeit für die KDP-I) :

**«1.3. Consequences of conducting activities for the Kurdish political parties**

A Western diplomat and expert on Iran in Erbil explained that there **is no tolerance on the Iranian regime's side for any kind of activities with connection to the Kurdish political parties and any affiliation with one of these parties would be reason for arrest.** The main reason for this is that these parties' ultimate goal, despite their non-violent opposition, is a change in the regime of Iran which is much worse than support for the Green Movement which aims for reforms within the existing system. The Western diplomat and expert on Iran in Erbil informed the delegation that the **execution rate is high among Kurds in Iran.** A large part of these executions are based on accusation of drug smuggling. The source pointed out that sometimes political activists are executed under the pretext of being drug smugglers. (...) According to Ziryan Roj Helaty (Tanupo Magazine), the Iranian regime is highly sensitive to the Kurdish population in Iran, and the regime always reacts disproportionately towards activities conducted by Kurds. **As a result, if the Iranian regime for instance catches a sympathizer carrying out an activity against the government, the consequences for him and his family will be serious.** Analyst Ziryan Roj Helaty (Tanupo Magazine) stated that anything related to KDPI, even talking about the Kurdish people and their rights could create a problem. **Someone who talks directly about KDPI is, in the eyes of the regime, affiliated with KDPI, and a person speaking about Kurdish rights is seen as a general threat.** According to the source, Kurdish patriotism that has spread throughout the Middle East in recent years, may also reach Iran, and this is exactly what the regime in Iran fears. (...)

Badria Ibrahim Rashid, Norwegian People's Aid - Iraq (NPA-Iraq), stated that the Iranian regime occasionally uses the **accusation of being drug dealer as a pretext to arrest and punish persons whom they suspect of conducting political activities, but whom they do not have any evidence against.** Ebrahim Alizadeh, General Secretary of the Kurdistan Organization of the Communist Party of Iran, Komala (Komala, SKHKI) mentioned that **if the authorities in Iran cannot find evidence against a person whom they perceive to be a threat and thus cannot prosecute him, they may terrorize or even assassinate him.**

### 1.3.1. Consequences for party members

According to UNHCR in Erbil, persons with a high political profile as well as human rights activists are targeted. UNHCR Erbil explained that their knowledge on the situation in the Kurdish region of Iran basically stems from the general feedback from the Iranian Kurdish asylum seekers. **UNHCR said that members of KDPI will get approximately two to ten years of prison if they are arrested by the Iranian authorities. Based on information from asylum seekers, UNHCR Erbil stated that KDPI members will be tortured during pre-trial detention in order to confess and disclose names of other KDPI members. The duration of the detention will typically be from one to six months depending on the level of the detainee's engagement. The sentence which is imprisonment will depend on the level of the engagement of the person and the evidence that are presented against him.** (...) Mustafa Moloudi (KDP-Iran) explained that **some of the party members who had been conducting secret activities in Iran were caught by the regime. While some of them were executed and some were freed after a period of detention, others were exchanged. However, those who were freed lost their public jobs, for instance if they**

were working as teacher, and they were not allowed to work anymore in the public sector. (...)

### 1.3.2. Consequences for party sympathizers

Regarding the sympathizers, UNHCR added that if **a person who actively assists and supports KDPI is arrested by the authorities, the person will face serious difficulties.** UNHCR Erbil further stated that **low profile supporters of KDPI will be taken to detention and be kept there for few days. Sometimes, they are tortured during the interrogation to confess.** Later on they will be taken to court and they sign a statement indicating that they will not be involved in any political parties in the future. (...) Asked to elaborate about the typical consequences for sympathizers caught while for instance distributing leaflets **Mohemed Sahebi, Member of Central Committee (KDPI) told the delegation that it does not make any difference whether a person is a sympathizer or a member, the consequences can be imprisonment and torture.** If a person believes in freedom and performs activities in this regard he or she will be under pressure and the consequences can be harsh. **Mohammed Sahabi (KDPI) added that many prisons in the Kurdish areas of Iran are hidden and humanitarian organisations have no access and are thus not able to monitor these facilities.»**

Quelle: DIS – Danish Immigration Service: Iranian Kurds; On Conditions for Iranian Kurdish Parties in Iran and KRI, Activities in the Kurdish Area of Iran, Conditions in Border Area and Situation of Returnees from KRI to Iran; 30 May to 9 June 2013 , 30. September 2013, S.15-17: [www.ecoi.net/file\\_upload/1226\\_1380796700\\_fact-finding-iranian-kurds-2013.pdf](http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1380796700_fact-finding-iranian-kurds-2013.pdf).

### «2.2.3. Recruitment to and membership of KDP-Iran

According to **Mustafa Moloudi (KDP-Iran), the requirements for people who want to become members of the party are first of all that they adhere to the goals and principles of the party, secondly that they have reached the age of 18, thirdly that they are of Iranian Kurdish origin, fourthly that they are recommended by two party members and finally that they must pay a monthly membership fee paid by all members.** **Mustafa Moloudi (KDP-Iran) further explained that there are two types of membership of KDP Iran: ordinary members and professional or full time members. A person who wants to become a party member must go through two months of training in the party's training center in KRI. During these two months, aspirants are being taught about the party program and ideology and they also receive practical military training. During the whole period they will go through physical training.**

**Mustafa Moloudi (KDP-Iran) stated that most of the high ranking professional members are living in the camp near Khoysanjaq, KRI, which is the party's headquarters and the party is being managed from there. The source added that some of the members living in the party's camp in KRI, particularly high ranking members, are known to the Iranian government by name and the city they originate from.**

**When asked how an ordinary KDP-Iran member can become a professional member, Mustafa Moloudi (KDP-Iran) replied that after being peshmarga and ordinary**

*member for some years, for instance three years, the person will participate in another training course called 'Basic Political-Organizational course' which usually takes from 45 days to two months. After the person has passed this course and a certificate is issued by the party's training commission, if he works full time for the party for about one year, he will be promoted to the fourth grade cadre by the party's political-military commission. After some time, the person will again attend a new training course which will also take about two months, and he can be promoted to the third grade cadre by the party's political-military commission after having passed the training course and worked for the party for some time. The procedure will be the same when the member is promoted from the third to the second grade cadre. The only difference is that it is the party's Political Bureau – and not the party's political-military commission – who decides whether a third grade cadre member should be promoted to the second grade cadre. A member is promoted to the first grade cadre, which is the highest level of party membership, when he is elected by the party congress to serve in the party's Central Committee. Also replaceable members of the Central Committee are first grade cadre members.*

*Mustafa Moloudi (KDP-Iran) explained the process of recruitment of new members in Iran by saying that potential recruits are watched by the party members for a while. If a person is assessed to be a qualified and trustworthy candidate, then he will be approached by the party member watching him and asked if he is interested to join the party. If the candidate accepts to join the party and if the party finds it necessary, he will be sent to KRI to receive training. The source emphasized that recruitment of new members in Iran is not an easy task, and the involved party members will face a number of difficulties in this process, particularly due to the difficult security situation in Iran. Regarding the profile of the recruited, the source stated that the party focuses on recruitment of young people, particularly university students and educated men and women. The source stressed that the procedure for being recruited to the party is the same for men and women.*

*Regarding persons who want to become member of the party in Iran, Mustafa Moloudi (KDP-Iran) stated that they do not need to go to the party training center in KRI as they are trained by people from the party organization inside Iran. However, it sometimes happens that these aspirants secretly are brought to the party training center in KRI and trained there. With regard to the party members working secretly in Iran, Mustafa Moloudi (KDP-Iran) stated that some of these members come to the camp in KRI to receive training on how to deal with their secret work and how they should act in case their activities are revealed to the authorities in Iran, e.g. how to defend themselves, or what they should do in case they are imprisoned. Mustafa Moloudi (KDP-Iran) informed the delegation that **if a person wishes to work professionally and full time for KDP-Iran in the party's camp in KRI, he is required to become peshmarga first.** The source added that the party camp of KDP-Iran is like a small city state in which all tasks are carried out by the party itself which for instance means that the peshmergas guard as well as clean the camp.*

*Mustafa Moloudi (KDP-Iran) stated that the party camp has its own TV channel named 'Kurd Kanal' and its own newspaper and website. The party has special cadres inside the camp working on different issues: women, children, the youth, students and political prisoners. The source also mentioned that the party has set up a commission for*

*household and services, another commission for security and intelligence and a commission for political organization of peshmerga. If the party in the future has to conduct military operation in Iran, it will be the political-military commission which will be responsible for this»*

Quelle: DIS – Danish Immigration Service: Iranian Kurds; On Conditions for Iranian Kurdish Parties in Iran and KRI, Activities in the Kurdish Area of Iran, Conditions in Border Area and Situation of Returnees from KRI to Iran; 30 May to 9 June 2013 , 30. September 2013, S.36-38: [www.ecoi.net/file\\_upload/1226\\_1380796700\\_fact-finding-iranian-kurds-2013.pdf](http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1380796700_fact-finding-iranian-kurds-2013.pdf).

DIS, 2013: (Präsenz iranischer Geheimdienst in KRI)

«5.2. **Presence of Iranian intelligence in KRI**

*Fazel Hawramy, a Kurdish journalist and blogger informed the delegation that if the activists who flee to KRI are low profile, it is very unlikely that they are secretly taken back to Iran because the authorities in KRI would not appreciate such an act given that the opposition media in KRI will use this as a political tool to bash the government. **However, what is important to state is that the authorities in Iran can take people back across the border secretly. They have that ability and power to do that. But it is difficult to assess who is low profile or high profile because it is very difficult if not impossible for anyone to know the mindset of the authorities running Iran.***

*An NGO working with asylum seekers and refugees in Iraq **stated that the Iranian intelligence agents are present in KRI, and they have good relations with some of the Iraqi Kurdish political parties in KRI.** Formerly, the Iranian intelligence service assassinated Iranians living in KRI but since 2009 this has no longer taken place.*

*Sardar Mohammad and Asos Hardi (Awene Newspaper) **said that the Iranian intelligence service is present in KRI.** The source further informed the delegation that between 400 and 500 persons have been assassinated in KRI/Sulaimania by Iranian secret service since 1992. Assassinations took place in different cities of KRI, especially Sulaimania, Erbil and towns around them. The source personally know people from Iran, for instance from Seqqiz who have been killed by Iranian intelligence services in Sulaimaniyah. It was added that assassinations are rare now. **According to the source, Iranians are monitored in KRI; some have received threats by text messages and some have been spied on.***

*Sardar Mohammad and Asos Hardi (Awene Newspaper) **pointed to the strong presence of the Iranian intelligence in KRI and their ability to monitor Iranian nationals and their activities in the area. The source added that many Iranians residing in KRI have received threats from the Iranian intelligence service or have had their telephones tapped.»***

Quelle: DIS – Danish Immigration Service: Iranian Kurds; On Conditions for Iranian Kurdish Parties in Iran and KRI, Activities in the Kurdish Area of Iran, Conditions in Border Area and Situation of Returnees from KRI to Iran; 30 May to 9 June 2013 , 30. September 2013, S.36-38: [www.ecoi.net/file\\_upload/1226\\_1380796700\\_fact-finding-iranian-kurds-2013.pdf](http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1380796700_fact-finding-iranian-kurds-2013.pdf).

DIS, 2013 (Gefährdung Rückkehrende):

«8.2. **Difference in risk to low-profile returnees with regard to whether they have lived in or outside the camps in Iraq**

According to Reza Menuchehri (KMMK), **it will definitely be taken into account by the Iranian regime whether or not a person has stayed in a refugee camp in KRI.** At the same time, they might ease pressure on some of these returnees as the government has an interest in sending a signal to the rest of the world that Iran does indeed accept persons who are no longer in opposition to the Iranian regime and that the Iranian government makes a serious effort in taking them back. Asked to elaborate on the situation of refugees from now-closed Al-Tash camp or one of the other refugee camps in case of return to Iran, Reza Menuchehri (KMMK) stated that both former Al-Tash refugees and people from other refugee camps have fled Iran due to the threat from the regime.

**All refugee camps in KRI have connections to the political parties who are somehow active in the camps, and people from these camps will be looked upon with suspicion if they return to Iran.** The fact that many of these people have fled to and remained in Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war is also considered problematic by the Iranian authorities. The source had however no knowledge of former Al-Tash refugees who have actually returned to Iran. Nevertheless the source had no doubt that these refugees will be looked upon with suspicion. Analyst Ziryan Roj Helaty (Tanupo Magazine) said that refugees with no political affiliations who stayed in the former Al-Tash camp will be able to return to Iran. **For refugees with political affiliations who returned to Iran, problems should be expected.** Asked about the types of reaction, the source replied that the reaction of the regime will be difficult to assess as there is no legislation on the issue. If a returnee has stayed in a party camp in KRI, it could have consequences. For other camps it is difficult to predict how the authorities will react. When asked whether staying in a refugee camp in KRI such as Al-Tash in general will cause more suspicion among the Iranian authorities upon return compared to those having stayed outside the refugee camps, the source assumed that it would make a difference for a returnee whether he had stayed in a camp or not. The source had, however, no knowledge of cases in which Al-Tash refugees returned to Iran. **The source mentioned a case in which a person affiliated with a political opposition party returned to Iran and he was imprisoned for three years. Three years after being released, he is still asked to report to the authorities on a regular basis, and he cannot get a passport.** Regarding the regime's treatment of returned person's family, the source said that in general, as long as the regime can reach an activist the family will not be harassed. When asked whether a Kurd who has left Iran legally and stayed in KRI for a long time without being involved in any political activity will face suspicion upon his return by the Iranian authorities, the source replied that if such person returns with a passport, he will usually not get any problems. The source emphasized, however, that due to the exacerbating political and financial situation in Iran, Iranian Kurds residing in KRI have not been interested in returning in recent years.

When asked about the Iranian refugees who return from KRI to Iran, Sardar Mohammad and Asos Hardi (Awene Newspaper) considered it dangerous for a person to return to Iran after having spent many years in the now-closed Al-Tash camp or one of the other refugee camps. The source assumed that particularly the former Al-Tash refugees may be at risk if they return to Iran as both the party 'People Mojahedin of

Iran' and KDPI have been active in Al-Tash camp, and because the Iranian regime will look at the former Al-Tash refugees as those who have supported opposition parties and even Saddam Hussein. Even if the former Al-Tash refugees have not been politically active, they will still be considered to be against Iran. However, the source had no knowledge of such returns actually taking place.

**Asked about the situation of a returnee having lived in KRI for many years outside the refugee camps in KRI, Sardar Mohammad and Asos Hardi (Awene Newspaper) replied that there will certainly be a kind of investigation about what he has done during his stay in KRI. During the investigation, he may be detained and then freed on bail. The source emphasized that the regime's reaction will mainly be based on two criteria: whether the person has stayed in KRI legally and whether he has been in contact with KDPI or other Kurdish political parties. The source added that if there is evidence of political activities, the returnee can expect problems.»**

Quelle: DIS – Danish Immigration Service: Iranian Kurds; On Conditions for Iranian Kurdish Parties in Iran and KRI, Activities in the Kurdish Area of Iran, Conditions in Border Area and Situation of Returnees from KRI to Iran; 30 May to 9 June 2013, 30. September 2013, S.73-74: [www.ecoi.net/file\\_upload/1226\\_1380796700\\_fact-finding-iranian-kurds-2013.pdf](http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1380796700_fact-finding-iranian-kurds-2013.pdf).

UN General Assembly, 2015:

**«The Islamic Republic of Iran continues, however, to execute more individuals per capita than any other country in the world. Executions have been rising at an exponential rate since 2005 and peaked in 2014, at a shocking 753 executions. This spate reportedly accelerated at a further staggering rate during the first seven months of this year. At least 694 individuals were reportedly executed by hanging as at 15 September 2015, including at least 10 women and one juvenile. At least 33 executions reportedly took place in public.5 As shown in figure II, at least 694 executions took place from 1 January to 15 September 2015, likely putting the execution rate during the first half of 2015 at its highest in some 25 years.»** Quelle: UN General Assembly: Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 6 Oktober 2015, S. 4: [www.ecoi.net/file\\_upload/1226\\_1448285597\\_n1530104.pdf](http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1448285597_n1530104.pdf).

UN Human Rights Council, 2015:

**« At the end of the period under review, 33 members of the Kurdish community were reportedly on death row after having been sentenced to death on national security-related offences, including spreading propaganda against the system, gathering and colluding against national security, 'corruption on earth' and 'enmity against God'. Serious concerns remained with regard to their guarantees of due process, given that, during pretrial detention, they were allegedly tortured and ill-treated, held for several months in solitary confinement and denied access to counsel or family members. (...) It is feared that these individuals might have been jailed for their promotion of the Sunni religion by taking part in seminars and distributing religious reading material. »** Quelle: UN Human Rights Council: Report of the Secretary-General to the UN Human Rights Council: Situation of human rights in the Islamic

Republic of Iran [A/HRC/28/26], 20. Februar 2015, S. 13-14: [www.ecoi.net/file\\_upload/1930\\_1425383716\\_a-hrc-28-26-eng.doc](http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1930_1425383716_a-hrc-28-26-eng.doc).

USDOS, 2015:

**«The government continued to use security law, media law, and other legislation to arrest and prosecute Kurds for exercising their rights to freedom of expression and association. The government reportedly banned Kurdish-language newspapers, journals, and books and punished publishers, journalists, and writers for opposing and criticizing government policies. (...) Authorities suppressed legitimate activities of Kurdish NGOs by denying them registration permits or bringing security charges against persons working with such organizations.»** (USDOS, 25 June 2015, section 6)  
Quelle: USDOS – US Department of State: Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2014 – Iran, 25. Juni 2015: [www.ecoi.net/local\\_link/306266/429645\\_en.html](http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/306266/429645_en.html).

IHRDC, 2012:

**‘Today, the IRI’s [Islamic Republic of Iran] suspicions concerning the Kurdish minority are based on fear that Kurdish activism contains separatist undercurrents that challenge the integrity of the state. Activists asserting their Kurdish identity or who engage in social and political criticism of the IRI are prime targets for arbitrary arrest and prosecution on the pretext of endangering national security. While some Kurdish political activists may engage in violent acts against the Iranian state or are involved with PJAK - an armed Kurdish political group - others only engage in peaceful civic activities, yet suffer on account of their larger group association. [...]**

Numerous witnesses interviewed by IHRDC stated that Iranian intelligence agents closely monitored their work on Kurdish cultural newspapers and magazines, with groups that organized Kurdish cultural plays and gatherings, and to preserve Kurdish cultural heritage and history. The work on these publications and events at these gatherings are closely monitored by government officials in direct violation of the Constitution of the IRI. The herasat - the intelligence gathering apparatus and morality police present in all government institutions, including on university campuses - collects intelligence on Kurdish activists and sometimes reports them to local intelligence authorities. When these publications and gatherings attract the attention of the authorities they are often shut down. Sometimes the activists themselves are targeted for arrest and imprisonment. Activists that engage in peaceful activities related to political parties are also a prime target of the Iranian authorities. Members of groups that offered monetary aid or emotional support to family members of killed Kurdish political party members said they were arrested by the Iranian authorities on allegations of aiding illegal groups. Even poetry and literary writing - if political in tone - can land the author in jail for allegedly sympathizing with political opposition groups. **Once a Kurdish activist is targeted for arrest and imprisonment, they are subjected to the same pattern of mistreatment and deprivation of due process safeguards that political prisoners throughout Iran endure.** It is not just the activists themselves who remain at risk of harassment by authorities for their political initiatives. By extension, the family members of activists in Iran’s Kurdish region are often threatened, intimidated, and otherwise harassed. In more extreme cases, family members are imprisoned by the IRI’s intelligence apparatus to exert pressure on loved ones, or forced

into hiding as a result of threats of arrest. » Quelle: IHRDC – Iran Human Rights Documentation Center: On the Margins: Arrest, Imprisonment and Execution of Kurdish Activists in Iran Today, April 2012, S. 13-14:  
[www.iranhrdc.org/files.php?force&file=reports\\_en/On\\_The\\_Margins\\_925054930.pdf](http://www.iranhrdc.org/files.php?force&file=reports_en/On_The_Margins_925054930.pdf).

«Evidence demonstrates that the IRI's arrest of Kurdish activists follow a pattern. First, local branches of the **government's intelligence and security apparatus typically initiate a pretext for arrest, such as allegations related to other illegal activity. Most often these relate to espionage, possession of arms or other materiel, or drug trafficking.** Such pretexts are not, however, always invoked - in some instances, Kurdish minorities have been targeted for simply being in possession of a pamphlet or CD made by Kurdish political parties. » Quelle: IHRDC – Iran Human Rights Documentation Center: On the Margins: Arrest, Imprisonment and Execution of Kurdish Activists in Iran Today, April 2012, S. 2: [www.iranhrdc.org/files.php?force&file=reports\\_en/On\\_The\\_Margins\\_925054930.pdf](http://www.iranhrdc.org/files.php?force&file=reports_en/On_The_Margins_925054930.pdf).

HRW, 2014:

«**During the course of its investigation into political prisoners in Karaj, Human Rights Watch compiled information regarding several dozen political opposition members, some of whom were members or supporters (or allegedly belonged to) of the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization, and others who were members or supporters (or allegedly belonged to) Kurdish and Baluch political opposition groups such as the Democratic Party of Kurdistan (PDKI), Komala, or the Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK). The judiciary has convicted many of these individuals of violence or involvement in terrorism-related activities and they are serving heavy prison sentences. Revolutionary courts have sentenced some of these prisoners to death.**» Quelle: HRW – Human Rights Watch: Locked Up in Karaj Spotlight on Political Prisoners in One Iranian City, 18 August 2014, S. 30: [www.ecoi.net/file\\_upload/1788\\_1408476534\\_iran0814-forupload-1.pdf](http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1788_1408476534_iran0814-forupload-1.pdf).

«Twenty-two of the 126 prisoners belong to political opposition parties such as the Mojahedin-e Khalq and several leftist Kurdish parties, **including the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran and Komala, according to information gathered by Human Rights Watch. These detainees are being held in Room 12 of Ward 4 of Rajai Shahr prison. In 2010 officials convicted two of them, Kurdish activists Loghman and Zaniar Moradi, who are cousins, of 'enmity against God' and 'corruption on earth,' according to a source familiar with their case. The two were convicted for their membership in the banned Komala party, which advocates Kurdish autonomy, and for their alleged involvement in the killing of the son of a Sunni Muslim cleric in the western city of Marivan the source said. They deny any involvement in the killing, and say that during the initial phase of their pretrial detention, Intelligence Ministry agents accused them only of connection to Komala, not with killing the cleric's son. Over several months, Intelligence Ministry agents in the northwestern city of Sanandaj severely tortured them during interrogation, the source said, including with threats of sexual assault, apparently to pressure them to turn in one of the cousin's fathers, whom the men said the government has targeted for years, and who is currently in Iraqi Kurdistan. When the two men refused to cooperate, the judiciary eventually indicted the two men on murder charges as well as with cooperating with Komala. (...)** Human Rights

**Watch has also acquired a list of names of 86 other prisoners held in Ward 4, Room 10 of Rajai Shahr prison, and two others held in Ghezel Hesar prison, detained on various national security-related charges including terrorism-related ones. Little is known about the activities or the circumstances of the arrests and convictions of these individuals, but many faced trial in revolutionary courts after weeks, if not months, at Intelligence Ministry detention facilities located in Iran's Kurdish-majority areas. They are believed to have been tortured or otherwise ill-treated during that time.**» Quelle: HRW – Human Rights Watch: Locked Up in Karaj Spotlight on Political Prisoners in One Iranian City, 18 August 2014, S. 43-44: [www.ecoi.net/file\\_upload/1788\\_1408476534\\_iran0814-forupload-1.pdf](http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1788_1408476534_iran0814-forupload-1.pdf).

AI, 2012:

**«The Iranian authorities have long been suspicious of Iran's ethnic minorities, including Ahwazi Arabs, Azerbaijanis, Baluch, Kurds and Turkmen, many of which are situated in border areas. ... members of the Kurdish minority who express any form of peaceful dissent are vulnerable to accusations of participation in banned Kurdish political groups such as KDPI, Komala and PJAK. Such accusations put them at even greater risk of serious human rights violations including torture and the death penalty'.**» Quelle: Amnesty International, Iran: 'We are ordered to crush you': Expanding repression of dissent in Iran, 28. Februar 2012, S.50. [www.amnesty.org/en/documents/MDE13/002/2012/en/](http://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/MDE13/002/2012/en/).

**«Demands by ethnic minority rights activists for greater rights have, for many years, been suppressed, in the context of armed opposition from some groups, particularly from the Ahwazi Arab, Kurdish and Baluch communities. Activists from these communities who advocate for greater respect and protection of the rights of their communities – which face discrimination in law and practice in Iran – risk numerous human rights violations ranging from arbitrary arrest to the death penalty after unfair trial, as well as restrictions on movement and denial of other civil rights. This pattern continues in the context of a wide and generalized suppression of most forms of dissent over government policies.**» Quelle: Amnesty International, Iran: 'We are ordered to crush you': Expanding repression of dissent in Iran, 28. Februar 2012, S.33-34. [www.amnesty.org/en/documents/MDE13/002/2012/en/](http://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/MDE13/002/2012/en/)

## 2 Jalil Gadani

**Jalil Gadani.** Nach Angaben von *Carol Prunhuber* (2009) war Jalil Gadani bis Ende der 1980er Jahre ein Mitglied des politischen Büros der KDP (Iran), später KDPI. Er war laut der gleichen Quelle ein langjähriger Partei-Kämpfer und wurde in Iran zweimal zum Tode verurteilt aber nicht hingerichtet. Er verbüsste mehrere Gefängnisstrafen in Iran. Laut *Gunter* (2010) führte Gadani zeitweilig eine Splittergruppe, die *KDPI-Revolutionary Leadership*, an, welche den damaligen Anführer der KDPI Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou beschuldigte, den Sozialismus verlassen zu haben und auf undemokratische Methoden zurückzugreifen. Ghassemlou und der darauffolgende Führer der KDPI wurden in den Jahren 1989 und 1992 vom iranischen Geheimdienst ermordet. Verschiedene weitere Quellen (*BBC Monitoring Alert*, 2010; *Zjir Rashaan*, 2007; *The International Bureau of Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan*, 2002) weisen

darauf hin, dass Gadani auch danach weiter für die KDPI respektive die KDP-I in einer Führungsposition tätig war.

Prunhuber, 2009:

**PEOPLE CLOSE TO ABDUL RAHMAN GHASSEMLOU AND THE KDPI**

**Abdulli, Fatah.** Representative of the KDPI in Europe since 1989.  
Assassinated in Berlin on September 17, 1992, by agents of the Iranian government.

**Gadani, Jalil.** Member of the political bureau of the KDP (Iran), later the KDPI, until the end of the 1980s.

Quelle: Carol Prunhuber, *The Passion and Death of Rahman the Kurd*, 2009, S. 303.

Two days before the referendum, Ghassemlou traveled to Qom. He had requested a meeting with the Ayatollah and was accompanied by a group of party members. Among them was **Jalil Gadani**, an old party militant, who had been condemned to death twice by the Shah's regime.<sup>95</sup>

**Gadani** had served time in different prisons. The first time he was detained in his student years, after a letter that he had mailed was intercepted. Afterward, he became politically active with Mossadegh's nationalists. He was caught distributing propaganda and sent to prison for seven months. In 1954, accused of being a member of the KDP, he spent a full year behind bars. He was working with farmers and peasants in 1967 when he was arrested once more. He spent time in prisons in Mahabad, Tehran, and Tabriz. He was condemned to death, but was not executed.

He lived through the harshness of the southern prisons near the Persian Gulf. "There I suffered physical and psychological torture. The heat was terrible. There were all types of people in jail: intellectuals, peasants, workers. Sometimes we were put together with criminals." He was arrested for the final time in 1969 for having participated in one of the first marches against the Shah. Once more he was condemned to death. "But people's protests stopped the execution," he said.

**Gadani** was in Tehran when the revolution broke out. He left prison on a Friday in 1979, and his first impression outside was of the people's fear. "At that point, we had not yet gathered around Dr. Ghassemlou. We spoke with people in the mosques and in the streets. These groups were all working on their own. I also saw Khomeini when he came back. He had offered rights to all the people of Iran, and I was in Tehran when he arrived. I saw him step off the plane. A vivacious crowd welcomed him. This was the most important reception in the history of Iran."

Years later in the mountains of Kurdistan, speaking about his visit with Khomeini, **Gadani** said: "We were five or six. I was there as the one responsible for Tehran; others were responsible for their regions and from the central committee. We were the first political organization that Khomeini received, though in the end, he did not accept our petition."

Quelle: Carol Prunhuber, *The Passion and Death of Rahman the Kurd*, 2009, S. 61.

Gunter, 2010:

*«**Jalil Ghadani led a faction called KDPI-Revolutionary Leadership** which accused Ghassemlou of abandoning socialism and using undemocratic methods. Iranian agents assassinated Ghassemlou in August 1989 and his successor Sadiq Sharafkindi three years later. Mustafa Hijri became the new leader of the KDPI, **but by 2007 the party had split into the KDPI and the KDP-I** (the precise meaning of the hyphen in the*

*second term is not clear). Most of the main KDPI leaders, including Abdullah Hassanzadeh (who some sources claim had actually been the party's leader from 1993 to 2005), left the KDPI and began to build up the KDP-I.»*

Quelle: Michael M. Gunter, Historical Dictionary of the Kurds, 2010, S. 175-176.

Zjir Rashaan, 2007:

*«Recentelijk liet Jalil Gadani, een partijfunctionaris van de Democratische Partij van Koerdistan-Iran (KDP-I), weten dat er degelijk contacten en overeenkomsten zijn tussen KDP-I en PJAK. Gadani wilde echter niet ingaan op verder details.»* Quelle: Zjir Rashaan, De achtergrond van de PJAK (Zjir Rashaan), 1. September 2007:

<http://azady.nl/?p=391>.

The International Bureau of Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, 2002:

*«Comrade Abdullah Hassanzadeh, the Secretary-general met Karl Schramek the Austrian ambassador in the Organization for European Security, Development and Cooperation in 4 October 2002. In this meeting, Jalil Gadani, member of Central Committee and Khosrow Abdullahi, PDKI International Relation chief were also present. In this friendly visit, both sides exchanged views on the region's circumstances. On the Kurdish issue as an important regional matter, Dr. Schramek insisted that without a just solution to the issue, a permanent peace in the region is impossible. Dr. Schramek also expressed his support for rational and realistic policies of PDKI.»*

Quelle: The International Bureau of Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, Iranian Kurdistan Bulletin, PDKI Secretary-general met Karl Schramek, the Austrian Ambassador to the Organization for European Security, development and Cooperation, 4. November 2002: [www.pdk-iran.org/english/kurdistanbulletin/no4.htm](http://www.pdk-iran.org/english/kurdistanbulletin/no4.htm).

BBC Monitoring Alert, 2010:

*«2. Interview with Jalil Gadani, Iranian Kurdistan Democratic Party leader: says Iran shelling Kurdistan Region border areas on pretext of presence of Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) and Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) fighters in those areas, but the reality is that the Iranian attacks aim to undermine the region's security in a bid to push the Kurdish leadership to support the Shi'i lists in the formation of the Iraqi government; adds that Kurds should protest against the attacks across the region. (600 words, pp 1, 4).»* Quelle: Wikileaks, BBC Monitoring Alert – IRAQ, Iraqi Kurdish press highlights 16 Jun 10, 18. Juni 2010: [https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/81/811783\\_bbc-monitoring-alert-iraq-.html](https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/81/811783_bbc-monitoring-alert-iraq-.html).